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Politics of War and Peace 
Political Science 275 
3 Credit Hours 
CRN# 92871 
Fall 2015 
 
 
Professor Timothy J. White 
Office Hours:  TR 10:00-11:00, 2:30-3:45, and by appointment 
Office Phone:  (513) 745-2997 
Email – white@xavier.edu 
 
 
Summary of Course 
 
This course will assess the politics of war and peace by focusing primarily on one particular case:  Northern 
Ireland.  In order to become familiar with this case, students will read a book on the background of the 
conflict.  Students will then explore the lessons that have emerged from the peace process in Northern 
Ireland.  Building on constructivist assumptions, this course explains how different actors learned different 
lessons and how they evolved during the peace process as well as during the efforts to implement the 
Agreement.  Thus, this course explores the different lessons multiple actors learned as well as the more 
general lessons that might apply to peace processes in other national contexts.  This analyzes several 
theoretical perspectives including consociationalism, neo-conservatism, revolutionary analysis, theories of 
identity formation and change, the role of international political factors like ideology, the role of third 
parties in peace processes (including their role in economic assistance), civil society, and grassroots 
peacebuilding.  Many recent books and articles focus on the need for reconciliation between communities 
as integral to peace processes.  This important perspective is given special attention in this course.  This 
course goes beyond focusing on what contributes to the signing of peace agreements to what can be learned 
from the difficulties implementing these agreements.  Thus, this course will compel students to delve 
intensively into the politics and challenges of peacemaking and peacebuilding by studying one case. 
 
This course fulfills the university social science requirement.  The Social Sciences study human behavior 
and action in a systematic, rigorous, evidence based, generalizing, objective, and cumulative way. 
They apply the scientific method, using qualitative and quantitative techniques, to study how people behave 
and act as individuals, in groups, and in society.  In this course, you will analyze social issues using 
scientific research conducted with diverse populations.  You will become better able to describe the role 
and functions of social institutions, explain human behavior and relationships within complex social 
systems, and critically analyze social science issues within a larger historical and global context 
 
This course is part of the Xavier Core Curriculum, which aims to develop people of learning and reflection, 
integrity and achievement, in solidarity for and with others.  It addresses the following core learning 
objectives at the introductory level: 
Students recognize and cogently discuss significant questions in the humanities, arts, and 
the natural and social sciences. 
Students examine the diverse, complex and interdependent nature of people in the world. 
Students describe and examine the multifaceted character of society and how the inclusion of different 
perspectives can influence one’s worldview. 
This course also fulfills the Ethic, Religion, and Society Focus of the Core Curriculum. Consistent with the 
mission of Xavier University as a Jesuit, Catholic university rooted in the liberal arts tradition, the 
Ethics/Religion and Society (E/RS) sequence of courses provides a basis for you to become intellectually, 
morally and spiritually educated individuals capable of critical reflection on ethical and religious questions 
of social significance from the perspective of multiple disciplines with unique methods.  
Purpose of the E/RS elective: Through the E/RS elective, you will develop a more proficient and durable 
ability to reflect critically on ethical and/or religious questions of social significance. 
Student Learning Objectives 
This course is part of the Xavier Core Curriculum, which aims to develop people of learning and reflection, 
integrity and achievement, in solidarity for and with others.  It addresses the following core learning 
objectives at the intermediate level: 
Students apply the approaches of multiple disciplines to a significant issue. 
Students investigate the root causes of injustice with compassion and academic rigor. 
It also addresses these core learning objective(s) at an advanced level: 
Students identify and critically assess multiple dimensions of an ethical issue in an attempt to reach a 
conclusion. 
Students describe and examine the multifaceted character of society and how the inclusion of different 
perspectives can influence one’s worldview. 
Students examine the diverse, complex, and interdependent nature of people in the world. 
Assignments 
 
Each student will make two oral presentations based on the literature reviewed in the course that goes 
beyond the two assigned books.  This 10-15 minute presentation topic will be assigned early in the 
semester and will account for 15% of the student’s final grade.  In addition, each student will write papers 
based on a review of the literature that the student was assigned for his or her oral presentations.  This four 
to six page single-spaced paper accounts for 15% of the final grade and are to be emailed as word 
documents to white@xavier.edu.  These papers are due one week after the student makes the oral 
presentation.  
 
Exams 
 
There will be two exams in this course.  A take-home mid-term exam will be due on September 29th.  It 
should be sent as a word document to white@xavier.edu. This exam will test the Dixon and O’Kane text as 
well as the first three weeks of class lectures and discussions focusing on the recent history of Northern 
Ireland.  The exam will consist of Identification questions and account for 10% of the student’s final grade.  
There will also be a comprehensive take-home final exam that will be due on Tuesday, December15th.  
This exam will require students to analyze the topics covered in this course after the first exam by 
answering a series of essay questions.  This exam will account for 30% of the student’s final grade and 
should be emailed as word document to white@xavier.edu. 
   
Grading Policy  
 
Grades will be based on the following scale:  93-100=A, 90-92=A-, 87-89=B+, 83-86=B, 80-82=B-, 77-
79= C+, 73-76=C, 70-72=C-, 67-69=D+, 63-66=D, 60-62=D-, and below 60=F.  There is no curving or 
dropping of grades at the end of the semester.  There is no rewrite policy or extensions given for the 
research paper for the course although students will receive feedback on bibliographies, literature reviews, 
and rough drafts.  For a reference to the standards for grades, see the Department of Political Science 
Grading Guidelines provided below:   
A- to A  =   Superior critical reading, thinking and analytical skills. Detailed understanding of course 
readings.  Generally clear, well-organized writing that develops important issues in a 
thoughtful way. Analysis of texts is without technical or factual errors.  An excellent essay 
will significantly surpass the expectations of a good essay by demonstrating critical mastery 
of the logic, assumptions, and evidence of research sources. Excellent use of quotations and 
proper citation of texts.    
 
Class discussion is frequent and thoughtful; shows a very good grasp of the issues.  
 
B- to B+ = Good to Very Good critical reading, thinking and analytical skills. Solid understanding of 
course readings. Generally clear, well-organized writing that reports important issues in some 
detail. Analysis of texts is generally without technical or factual errors.  A good to very good 
essay will have a thesis, define and incorporate concepts appropriately, present a coherent 
argument, and make a persuasive case for its thesis using convincing evidence; it may also 
need to consider plausible and reasonable alternatives systematically. Good use of quotations 
and proper citation of texts.   
 
Class discussion is regular and helpful; shows a solid grasp of the issues.  
 
C- to C+ =  Adequate critical reading, thinking and analytical skills. Basic understanding of course 
readings.  Generally competent writing that identifies important issues but leaves them 
insufficiently explained or examined. Analysis of texts may be technically or factually 
defective in minor ways. An adequate essay will have a thesis, define and incorporate 
concepts appropriately, and present a coherent argument. Correct use of quotations and 
citation of texts. 
 
Class discussion is occasional and generally adequate; may reveal some misunderstanding of 
the issues.   
 
D- to D+ =  Inadequate critical reading, thinking and analytical skills. Poor or incompetent understanding 
of course readings. Below average writing that omits or misunderstands important issues. 
Analysis of texts may be technically or factually defective in substantial ways. An inadequate 
essay may not have a clear thesis, or may not define and incorporate concepts appropriately, 
or it may not present a coherent argument.  There may be ineffective use of quotations and 
inadequate citation of texts.  
Class discussion is infrequent; may reveal a lack of engagement with the issues or serious 
misunderstanding.  
 
     F =  Unacceptable. No serious engagement of course readings. An unacceptable essay shows little 
or no serious attempt to understand important issues.  Writing is unclear, or unorganized, or 
undeveloped to the degree that the essay is deemed a failure.  Analysis of texts may contain 
egregious errors. There may be a failure to cite texts.    
 
Class discussion is infrequent and ill informed; reveals no real understanding of even basic 
issues.  
 
Readings for the Course 
 
The following required books should be available in the University Bookstore. 
 
Paul Dixon and Eamonn O’Kane, Northern Ireland Since 1969 (New York:  Longman, 2011). 
 
Timothy J. White (ed.), Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Madison:  University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2013). 
 
Assigned Readings other than these two texts will be sent to you by email before well before the assigned 
reading dates.  In addition, there will be readings assigned to students for their oral presentations.  These 
readings can be found through the Xavier Library’s journal and book collections as well as through the 
Ohiolink system.  If you cannot find a source that is assigned, please see the professor. 
 
Schedule of Lectures and Readings 
 
Aug. 25 – Overview of the Course 
 
Aug. 27 – Historical Background to the Northern Ireland Conflict  
 
Dixon and O’Kane, Ch. 1-3. 
 
Origins and Overviews of the Conflict – For a brief historical overview of the conflict, see Aaron 
Edwards and Cillian McGrattan, The Northern Ireland Conflict (Oxford:  Oneworld, 2010).  For a long 
historical overview, see Paul Bew, Ireland:  The Politics of Enmity, 1789-2006 (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2007).  For the origins of the border that established Northern Ireland, see Catherine 
Nash, Bryonie Reid, and Brian Graham, Partitioned Lives:  The Irish Borderlands (Abingdon, Oxon:  
Ashgate, 2013), 15-40.  For further background to the conflict, especially the development of unionist and 
nationalist identities in the twentieth century, see Brian M. Walker, A Political History of the Two Irelands:  
From Partition to Peace (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  For an analysis that examines 
twentieth century history as one of “undoing” the original attempt at settlement early in the century, see 
Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question:  The Anglo-Irish Settlement and its Undoing 1912-72 (New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 1991).  For an overview of the conflict focusing on how each side became 
“entrenched “ in their positions, see Cillian McGrattan, Northern Ireland 1968-2008:  The Politics of 
Entrenchment (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  For an excellent historically informed narrative 
of the conflict and the peace process that stresses that the troubles were foreseeable, see Feargal Cochrane, 
Northern Ireland:  The Reluctant Peace (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2013).  For a recent brief 
overview of the conflict, see Nora Gribbin and Rodney Turtle, “The Roots of Conflict in Northern Ireland,” 
in Responses to Terrorism:  Can Psychosocial Approaches Break the Cycle of Violence? Ed. Colin Murray 
Parkes (London:  Routledge, 2014), 56-66.  For the failure of the Civil Rights Movement, see Landon E. 
Hancock, “We Shall Not Overcome:  Divided Identity and the Failure of NICRA 1968,” Ethnopolitics 13 
(5) (2014): 501-521.  For a review of Fianna Fáil policies up to the early 1970s, see Stephen Kelly, Fianna 
Fáil, Partition, and Northern Ireland 1926-1971 (Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 2013)and Gareth Ivory, 
“Fianna Fáil, Northern Ireland and the Limits on Conciliation, 1969-1973,” Irish Political Studies 29 (4) 
(2014): 522-546.  For a text that explores the evolution from conflict to peace in Northern Ireland relying 
on survey research see Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, Conflict to Peace:  Politics and Society in 
Northern Ireland over Half a Century (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2013). 
 
The Development of the Troubles - For why and how early efforts at power-sharing failed in the 1970s, 
see Michael Kerr, The Destructors:  The Story of Northern Ireland’s Lost Peace Process (Dublin:  Irish 
Academic Press, 2011).  Theoretically, there is a good argument that in democracies such as Britain 
attempts to use coercive or repressive force is counterproductive as it delegitimizes the regime.  For this 
general argument and evidence, see Ursula E. Daxecker and Michael L. Hess, “Repression Hurts:  Coercive 
Government Responses and the Demise of Terrorist Campaigns,” British Journal of Political Science 43 
(3) (2013): 559-577.  For an empirical assessment of the period of the troubles and the continuing nexus 
between conflict and repression, see Cyanne E. Loyle, Christopher Sullivan, and Christian Davenport, “The 
Northern Ireland Research Initiative:  Data on the Troubles from 1968 to 1998,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science (forthcoming).  For an overview of the period of direct rule from Westminster, see Derek 
Birrell, Direct Rule and the Governance of Northern Ireland (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
2009). For the emergence of a violent form of nationalism after the more peaceful civil rights movement 
and as a result of British counterinsurgency policy, see James Hughes, “State Violence in the Origins of 
Nationalism:  British Counterinsurgency and the Rebirth of Irish Nationalism, 1969-1972,” in Nationalism 
and War. Ed. John A. Hall and Siniša Milešević (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2013), 97-123.  
For an analysis of those who lost their lives in the Troubles, see David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian 
Feeney, and Chris Thornton, Lost Lives:  The Stories of Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result 
of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Edinburgh:  Mainstream, 2004).  For an analysis of Thatcher’s early 
policies and the resultant Huger Strikes, see Thomas Hennessey, Hunger Strike:  Margaret Thatcher’s 
Battle with the IRA 1980-1981 (Sallins, Co. Kildare:  Irish Academic Press, 2014).  For an anthropological 
view of this period, especially from a Catholic nationalist perspective, see William F. Kelleher Jr., The 
Troubles in Ballybogin:  Memory and Identity in Northern Ireland (Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan 
Press, 2003). 
 
Texts on Conflict Analysis, War, and Peace –Christopher S. Browning, International Security:  A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2013; Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security 
(3rd edition) (New York:  Routledge, 2013); Louis Kriesberg and Bruce W. Dayton, Constructive 
Conflicts:  From Escalation to Resolution (4th edition) (Lanham:  Rowman and Littlefield, 2012); Peter 
Hough, Shahin Malik, Andrew Moran, and Bruce Pilbeam, International Security Studies:  Theory and 
Practice (New York:  Routledge, 2015); Matthew Levinger, Conflict Analysis:  Understanding Causes, 
Unlocking Solutions (Washington:  United States Institute of Peace, 2013); Columba Peoples and Nick 
Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies:  An Introduction (2nd Edition) (New York:  Routledge, 
2015); Stephen L. Quackenbush, International Conflict:  Logic and Evidence (Los Angeles:  Sage, 2015); 
and Paul D. Williams, Security Studies:  An Introduction (2nd edition) (New York:  Routledge, 2012)  
provide good basic texts.  For a larger more encompassing analysis, see Greg Cashman, What Causes War?  
An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict (Second Edition) (Lanham, MD:  Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2014).  For a text focusing on conflict resolution, see Oliver Ramstotham, Tom Woodhouse, and 
Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (3rd edition) (Cambridge:  Polity, 2011).  For a reader in 
conflict resolution, see Hugh Miall, Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Christopher Mitchell, The 
Contemporary Conflict Resolution Reader (Cambridge:  Polity, 2015).  For a reader reviewing theories of 
war and peace, see John A. Vasquez, What Do We Know About War? (Second Edition) (Lanham, MD:  
Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).  For a text focusing on identities and conflict resolution, see Kevin Avruch, 
Context and Pretext in Conflict Resolution:  Conflict, Identity, Power and Practice (Boulder:  Paradigm 
Publishers, 2012).  Also see Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, The Arc of War:  Origins, Escalation 
and Transformation (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2011) for historical analysis of the onset and 
evolution of war.  For a text that summarizes 15 scientific approaches to Conflict Analysis, see Sara 
McLaughlin Mitchell and John A. Vasquez (eds.), Conflict, War, and Peace:  An Introduction to Scientific 
Research (Los Angeles:  Sage, 2014).  For an edited volume that focuses on the need to manage conflicts in 
an increasingly unordered world, see Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Managing 
Conflict in a World Apart (Washington:  US Institute of Peace, 2015).  For a good overview of how 
different paradigms in International Relations approach peace, see Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in 
International Relations (New York:  Routledge, 2008).  For a book comparing different peace processes, 
including the Northern Ireland peace process, see Jonathan Tonge, Comparative Peace Processes 
(Cambridge:  Polity, 2014).   For an overview of civil wars which are increasingly replacing traditional 
interstate war, see Karl DeRouen, An Introduction to Civil Wars (Los Angeles:  Sage, 2014) and Marie 
Olson Lounsbery and Frederic Pearson, Civil Wars:  Internal Struggles, Global Consequences (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2009). While we typically perceive that peace is the goal or objective, Keen 
contends that there are many who benefit from war and this explains why war persists.  See David Keen, 
Useful Enemies:  When Waging Wars is More Important than Winning Them (New Haven:  Yale 
University Press, 2012). 
  
International Relations Theory and Postcolonialism – Some emphasize Northern Ireland’s “Troubles” 
as a reaction to the failure of the decolonization process.  IR theory and postcolonialism is explored in 
Sandra Halperin, “International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of 
Modernity,” in Decolonizing International Relations, ed. B. G. Jones (Lanham, MD:  Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006), 43-64 and Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society:  Grotius, Colonialism and 
Order in World Politics (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2002).  For a postcolonial understanding 
of security studies, see Tarak Barkawi, “War, Armed Forces and Society in Postcolonial Perspective,” in 
Postcolonial Theory and International Relations:  A Critical Introduction, ed. Sanjay Seth (New York:  
Routledge, 2013), 87-105; Tarak Bakawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security 
Studies,” Review of International Studies 32 (4) (2006): 329-352; and Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial 
Subject:  Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity (New York:  Routledge, 2013).  Recent 
research highlights the colonial origins of contemporary failures to control ethnic and sectarian conflict.  
See Paul K. MacDonald, “Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion”:  The Colonial Origins of 
Counterinsurgency Failure,” International Organization 67 (2) (2013): 253-286.  For an attempt to explain 
the recent flags crisis in Northern Ireland from a settler versus native perspective, see Adrian Guelke, 
“Northern Ireland’s Flags Crisis and the Enduring Legacy of the Settler-Native Divide,” Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics 20 (1) (2014):133–151. 
 
Ethnic Conflict – Historical Approaches – Ethnic conflict emerges after the age of empire as national 
groups seek to achieve statehood and defeat ethnic minorities that challenge their ethno-national goals of 
self-governance in the modern world of states.  See Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War:  Nationalism, State 
Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
For a further exploration of the history of nations and how they produce ethnic based conflict, see John 
Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict (London:  Sage, 2005).   
 
Ethnic Conflict – Theoretical Explanations - Some have found that it was not states’ ethnic or religious 
characteristics but poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations that account for 
conflict.  See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review 97 (1) (2003): 75-90.  This built upon Fearon and Laitin’s earlier review essay 
that emphasized the social construction of identities and these can be reformulated to serve the interests of 
those who advocate violence and those who seek peace.  See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 
“Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (4) (2000): 845-
877.  For a recent formal theory of ethnic conflict, see Nicholas Sambanis and Moses Shayo, “Social 
Identification and Ethnic Conflict,” American Political Science Review 107 (2) (2013): 294-325.  For 
another recent theoretical overview of ethnicity as a cause of conflict, see Elaine K. Denny and Barbara F. 
Walter, “Ethnicity and Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2) (2014): 199-212.  For a book 
comparing politics in divided societies, see Adrian Guelke, Politics in Deeply Divided Societies 
Cambridge:  Polity, 2012).  
 
Ethnic Conflict and Other Factors - In understanding ethnic conflict, one must understand what 
mobilizes minorities.  This is important to understand the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement in 
Northern Ireland.  For a theory of ethnic bargaining that focuses on this, see Erin K. Jenne, Ethnic 
Bargaining:  The Paradox of Minority Empowerment (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2007).  Evan S. 
Lieberman and Prerna Singh suggest it is the state itself that can institutionalize ethnic conflict in “The 
Institutional Origins of Ethnic Violence,” Comparative Politics 45 (1) (2012): 1-24.  Matthew Lange 
explores the relationship between education and ethnic conflict that offers some interesting findings given 
Northern Ireland’s segregated education system in Educations in Ethnic Violence:  Identity, Educational 
Bubbles, and Resource Mobilization (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2012).  Martin Dowling 
explores the role of traditional music in the conflict and the peace process in “Traditional Music and the 
Peace Process in Northern Ireland,” in Traditional Music and Irish Society:  Historical Perspectives 
(Burlington, VT:  Ashgate, 2014), 249-312. 
 
The Ethnic or Sectarian Nature of the Northern Ireland Conflict - Northern Ireland is typically 
considered as having an ethnic or sectarian conflict.  These types of conflicts typically cause violence.  See 
Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson, “The Violent Consequences of the Nation:  Nationalism and the Initiation of 
Interstate War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (5) (2012): 825-852.  For how Northern Ireland was 
based on such an ethnic or sectarian conflict, see Marianne Elliott, When God Took Sides:  Religion and 
Identity in Ireland – Unfinished History (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2009); Patrick Geoghegan, 
“Beyond Orange and Green?  The Awkwardness of Negotiating Difference in Northern Ireland,” Irish 
Studies Review 16 (1) (2008): 173–194; Claire Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern 
Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate, 2006); and Brian Graham, “The 
Meaning of Northern Ireland,” in Understanding Contemporary Ireland, ed. Brendan Bartley and Rob 
Kitchin (London:  Pluto, 2007), 221-231.   
 
Efforts to Move Beyond Sectarianism in Northern Ireland – For the need to move beyond sectarianism 
to build peace and reconciliation, see Joseph Liechty and Cecelia Clegg, Moving Beyond Sectarianism:  
Religion, Conflict, and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Blackrock:  Columba, 2001).  For the failure of 
the peace process to overcome the sectarian conflict, see Owen McEldowney, James Anderson, and Ian 
Shuttleworth, “Sectarian Demography:  Dubious Discourses of Ethno-National Conflict,” in Political 
Discourse and Conflict Resolution:  Debating Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Katy Hayward and Catherine 
O’Donnell (London:  Routledge, 2011), 160-176.  For a recent study trying to illustrate how the sectarian 
divide could be overcome in electoral politics, see John Garry, “Potentially Voting across the Divide in 
Deeply Divided Places:  Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 
(Forthcoming). 
 
Sept. 1    Searching for Peace in Northern Ireland – The Anglo-Irish Agreement? 
 
Dixon and O’Kane, Ch. 4-5. 
 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement – Early Assessments –  For the background, text, and early evaluation of the 
Agreement, see Tom Hadden and Kevin Boyle, The Anglo-Irish Agreement:  Commentary, Text and 
Official Review (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 1989). For early evaluations of this Agreement, see Brendan 
O’Leary, ‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement: Meanings, Explanations, Results and a Defence,” in Beyond the 
Rhetoric: Politics, the Economy and Social Policy in Northern Ireland, ed. Paul Teague (London:  
Lawrence and Wishart, 1987), 11–41; Brendan O’Leary, “The Anglo-Irish Agreement: Folly or 
Statecraft?” in The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements, ed. Brendan O’ Leary and 
John McGarry (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2003), 62–96;  and William V. Shannon, “The Anglo-
Irish Agreement,” Foreign Affairs 64 (4) (1986): 849-870.   
 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement – Recent Assessments – See Arthur Aughey and Cathy Gormley-Heenan, 
“The Anglo-Irish Agreement:  25 Years On,” The Political Quarterly 82 (3) (2011): 389-397 and Eamonn 
O'Kane, "Re-evaluating the Anglo Irish Agreement:  Central or Incidental to the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process?" International Politics 44 (1) (2007): 711–731.  While the Anglo-Irish Agreement is typically 
seen as failing in terms of its inclusiveness, it may have brought institutional change that promoted the 
peace process.  See Jennifer Todd, “Institutional Change and Conflict Regulation:  The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (1985) and the Mechanisms of Change in Northern Ireland,” West European Politics 34 (4) 
(2011): 838-858.  Etain Tannam uses rational institutionalism as a theoretical approach to explain the 
growing cooperation that emerged from this period of Anglo-Irish diplomacy.  See Etain Tannam, 
“Explaining British-Irish Cooperation,” Review of International Studies 37 (3) (2011): 1191-1214.  Peter J. 
McLoughlin sees the effect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement as serendipitous to the effort by the SDLP to 
move Republicans in the North to a willingness to negotiate and enter a peace process.  See P. J. 
McLoughlin, “’The First Major Step in the Peace Process’?  Exploring the Impact of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement on Republican Thinking,” Irish Political Studies 29 (1) (2014): 116-133. 
 
Sept. 8   The Peace Process Leading to the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement  
 
Dixon and O’Kane, Ch. 6-7 
   
For a good narrative of the peace process, see Deaglán de Bréadún, The Far Side of Revenge:  Making 
Peace in Northern Ireland (Updated Edition) (Cork:  Collins Press, 2008).  
 
The Good Friday or Belfast Agreement – For overviews of the Agreement see William A. Hazleton, 
“Devolution and the Diffusion of Power:  The Internal and Transnational Dimensions of the Belfast 
Agreement,” in Irish Political Studies Reader:  Key Contributions, ed. Conor McGrath and Eoin O’Malley 
(New York:  Routledge, 2008), 334-350; Donald L. Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland 
Agreement:  The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus,” British Journal of Political Science 
32 (2) (2002): 193-220; Etain Tannam, “Explaining the Good Friday Agreement:  A Learning Process,” 
Government and Opposition 36 (4) (2001): 493-518; and Rick Wilford (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast 
Agreement (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2001).    
 
The Referendum Process for the 1998 Agreement in Northern Ireland and Prospect Theory – For the 
use of prospect theory to explain the passage of the referendum and selling the peace, see Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita, Rose McDermott, and E. Cope, “The Expected Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland,” 
International Interactions  27 (2) (2001): 129-167; Landon Hancock, “There is No Alternative:  Prospect 
Theory, the Yes Campaign and Selling the Good Friday Agreement,” Irish Political Studies 26 (1) (2013): 
95-116; and Landon E. Hancock, Joshua N. Weiss, and Glenn M. E. Duerr, “Prospect Theory and the 
Framing of the Good Friday Agreement,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 28 (2) (2011): 183-203.   
 
The 1998 Referendum and Legitimizing the Agreement - The Referendum that was held tended to 
legitimate the Agreement as found in other national contexts.  See Neophytos Loizides, “Negotiated 
Settlements and Peace Referendums,” European Journal of Political Research 53 (2) (2014): 234-249.  For 
the legitimization of the Agreement, see Laura Filardo-Llamas, “Discourse Worlds in Northern Ireland:  
The Legitimisation of the 1998 Agreement,” in Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution:  Debating 
Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Katy Hayward and Catherine O’Donnell (London:  Routledge, 2011), 62-
76.     
 
Sept. 15    Does Consociationalism or Power-Sharing Best Explain the Agreement? 
 
Consociationalism – For overviews of consociational theory, see John Coakley, Pathways from Ethnic 
Conflict:  Institutional Redesign in Divided Societies (New York:   Routledge, 2010) and Andrew Finlay, 
Governing Ethnic Conflict:  Consociationalism, Identity and the Price of Peace (New York:  Routledge, 
2011).  For an early formulation of consociational theory, see Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural 
Societies:  A Comparative Exploration (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1977).   
 
Power Sharing – For a recent overview of power sharing, see Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary 
(eds.), Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).  
For a positive view of power-sharing contributing to peace and stability after civil war, see Matthew 
Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, “Power Sharing in Peace Settlements:  Initiating the Transition from Civil 
War,” in Sustainable Peace:  Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald 
Rothchild (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2005), 83-106.  For a more critical examination of power 
sharing as contributing to peace and functioning democracy, see Donald L. Horowitz, “Ethnic Power 
Sharing:  Three Big Problems,” Journal of Democracy 25 (2) (2014): 5-20; Donald Rothchild and Philip G. 
Roeder, “Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy,” in Sustainable Peace:  Power and 
Democracy after Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 
2005), 29-50 and Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman, “The Myth of Consociationalism?  Conflict 
Reduction in Divided Societies,” Comparative Political Studies 45 (12) (2012): 1542-1571.  For an 
alternative to power sharing, see Philip G. Roeder, “Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power 
Sharing,” in Sustainable Peace:  Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald 
Rothchild (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2005), 51-82. 
 
Power Sharing and Electoral Systems – Some contend that closed List PR election systems offer the best 
chance for sustainable peace after conflict.  See Melani Cammett and Edmund Malesky, “Power Sharing in 
Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (6) 
(2012): 982-1016.   John Garry argues that there is some evidence of support for moderate parties across 
the communal divide in Northern Ireland in “Potentially Voting across the Divide in Deeply Divided 
Places:  Ethnic Catch-All Voting in Consociational Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 62 (S1) (2014): 2-
19. 
 
Is the Good Friday Agreement Consociational? – For the debate regarding consociationalism and its 
applicability to the Irish peace process, see Rob Aitken, “Consociational Peace Processes and Ethnicity:  
The Implications of the Dayton and Good Friday Agreements for Ethnic Identities and Politics in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Northern Ireland,” in The Challenges of Ethno-Nationalism:  Case Studies in Identity 
Politics, ed. Adrian Guelke (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 232-253; Paul Bew, “Myths of 
Consociationalism:  From Good Friday to Political Impasse,” in A Farewell to Arms?  Beyond the Good 
Friday Agreement (2nd ed.), ed. Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (Manchester:  
Manchester University Press, 2006), 57-68; John Coakley, “The Challenge of Consociation in Northern 
Ireland,” Parliamentary Affairs 64 (3) (2011): 473-493; Paul Dixon, “Why the Good Friday Agreement in 
Northern Ireland is Not Consociational,” Political Quarterly 76 (3) (2005): 357–67; John McGarry and 
Brendan O’Leary, “Consociational Theory and Peace Agreements in Pluri-National Places:  Northern 
Ireland and Other Cases,” in The Failure of the Middle East Peace Process?  A Comparative Analysis of 
Peace Implementation in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa, ed. Guy Ben-Porat (New 
York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 70-96; John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland 
Conflict:  Consociational Engagements (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2004); Ian O’Flynn, 
“Deliberative Democracy, the Public Interest and the Consociational Model,” Political Studies 58 (3) 
(2010): 572-589; Rupert Taylor, “The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism:  A 
Critique,” The Political Quarterly 77 (2) (2006): 217-226; and Rupert Taylor, Consociational Theory: 
McGarry & O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict (New York:  Routledge, 2011).  
 
Terminating Rivalries and Negotiating Settlements – See D. Scott Bennett, “Security, Bargaining, and 
the End of Interstate Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (2) (1996): 157-184; Daniel Bynum, 
Keeping the Peace:  Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002); Feargal Cochrane, Ending Wars (Cambridge:  Polity, 2008); Eric Cox, Why Enduring Rivalries 
Do—or Don’t—End (Boulder:  First Forum Press, 2010); Stephen L. Quackenbush and Jerome F. 
Venteicher, “Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 45 (6) 
(2008): 723-742; Karen Rasler, William R. Thompson, and Sumit Ganguly, How Rivalries End 
(Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Gennady Rudkevich, “Terminated or Just Interrupted?  How the End of a Rivalry 
Plants the Seeds of Future Conflict,” Social Science Quarterly 94 (1) (2013): 158-174; and Suzanne 
Werner and Amy Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” International Organization 59 (2) (2005): 262-293.  
For a book length examination of peacekeeping as a solution, see Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping 
Work?  Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2008).  
Sometimes the search for peace means trying to identify “islands of agreement” from which conflicting 
parties can expand their cooperation and build trust.  See Gabriella Blum, Islands of Agreement:  Managing 
Enduring Armed Rivalries (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2007). 
 
Sept. 17    Structural Factors and the Role of Agency in Peace Processes 
 
Negotiated Settlements and Civil Wars – David E. Cunningham, Barriers to Peace in Civil War 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2011) and Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting 
Peace:  Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park, PA:  The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).  Monica Duffy Toft finds that negotiated settlements of civil 
wars typically fail in “Ending Civil Wars:  A Case for Rebel Victory?” International Security 34 (4) 
(2010): 7–36 and Securing the Peace:  The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2010).  Alexander Downes agrees with Toft in “The Problem with Negotiated Settlements 
to Ethnic Civil Wars,” Security Studies 13 (4) (2004): 230-279.   Bumba Muherjee contends that decisive 
military victories, not stalemates, are associated with stable power-sharing peace settlements in “Why 
Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, but Not 
Others?” International Studies Quarterly 50 (2) (2006): 479-504.  Ramzi Badran argues that it is the quality 
of the negotiated settlement that determines whether peace agreements provide a more durable outcome.  
See Ramzi Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science (forthcoming).  Sunhee Park in “Power and Civil War Termination Bargaining,” 
International Studies Quarterly (forthcoming) contends the weaker bargaining participant, whether 
government or rebel demands more political power in a postwar state than its power  in negotiations 
predicts, while the stronger group is willing to overcompensate the weaker group to assuage its security 
concerns. 
Ripeness and Readiness Theory – For the classic formulation of ripeness theory, see I. William Zartman, 
“Ripeness:  The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, 
ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington:  National Research Council Press, 2000), 225-250 
and I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives:  Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” in 
Contemporary Peacemaking:  Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, (2nd ed.), ed. John Darby and 
Roger Mac Ginty (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 22-35.  Also see J. Michael Greig, “Moments 
of Opportunity:  Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring 
Rivals,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (6) (2001): 691-718 and Fred Ikle, Every War Must End 
(Revised 2nd edition) (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2005), 10-16.    
Ripeness and Readiness Theory Updated – For more formal presentations of this theory, see Navin A. 
Bapat, “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes,” Journal of Peace Research 42 (6) (2005): 699-
717 and Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of World Politics,” American 
Political Science Review 94 (2) (2000): 251-267.   For a recent empirical analysis of the argument that 
relatively equal power between rebels and governments lead to ceasefires and negotiated settlements, see 
Philip Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace?  The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement,” Journal 
of Peace Research 50 (5) (2013): 623-634.  For an exploration of the interdependence of bargaining that 
leads to peace see Michael G. Findley, “Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War 
Resolution,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57 (5) (2013): 905-932. 
Ripeness and Readiness Theory in the Northern Ireland Context - Dean G. Pruitt, “Readiness Theory 
and the Northern Ireland Conflict,” American Behavioral Scientist 50 (11) (2007): 1520-1541;  Not 
everyone agrees that the Agreement in Northern Ireland was reached based on a hurting stalemate; see 
Eamonn O”Kane, “The Perpetual Peace Process?  Examining Northern Ireland’s Never-ending, but 
Fundamentally Altering Peace Process,” Irish Political Studies 28 (4) (2013): 515-535; Eamonn O’Kane, 
“When Can Conflicts be Resolved?  A Critique of Ripeness,” Civil Wars 8 (3-4) (2006): 268-284; and 
Jonathan Tonge, Peter Shirlow, and James McAuley, “So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent?  How Interplay, 
not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Irish Political Studies 26 (1) (2011): 1-18.   
 
Path Dependency Theory and the Northern Ireland Peace Process – Cillian McGrattan, “Modern Irish 
Nationalism – Ideology, Policymaking, and Path-Dependent Change,” in The Challenges of Ethno-
Nationalism:  Case Studies in Identity Politics, ed. Adrian Guelke (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 177-190;  Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, “Path Dependence in Settlement Processes:  Explaining 
Settlement in Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 55 (2) (2007): 442-458 and Kirsten E. Schulze, “The 
Northern Ireland Political Process:  A Viable Approach to Conflict Resolution,” Irish Political Studies 12 
(1997): 92-110.   
 
The Role of Agency in the Northern Ireland Peace Process – See John Lord Alderdice, “Leadership,” in 
Responses to Terrorism:  Can Psychological Approaches Break the Cycle of Violence, ed. Colin Murray 
Parkes (London:  Routledge, 2014), 164-180.  The experience of Northern Ireland conforms to the more 
general finding that there are personal characteristics associated with political elites who pursue peace.  See 
Giacomo Chiozza and Ajin Choi, “Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950-
1990,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (3) (2003): 251-278.  The risk that leaders take when promoting 
peace often leads to electoral defeat as happened to SDLP and UUP leaders in Northern Ireland.  See 
Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry:  International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership 
Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science 48 (3) (2004): 555-570.  For an evaluation and 
usefulness of the numerous memoirs written by the actors in the peace process, see Stephen Hopkins, The 
Politics of Memoir and the Northern Ireland Conflict (Liverpool:  Liverpool University Press, 2013).  
Coakley and Todd suggest that an elite interview project at University College Dublin allows us to better 
understand how state actors came to the decisions they did during the Peace Process.  See John Coakley 
and Jennifer Todd, “Breaking Patterns of Conflict in Northern Ireland:  New Perspectives,” Irish Political 
Studies 29 (1) (2014): 1-14. 
 
The IRA and the Northern Ireland Conflict – Most depict the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a typical 
armed ethno-national group seeking their nationally inspired aspiration for sovereignty and independence.  
See Rogelio Alonso, The IRA and Armed Struggle (New York:  Routledge, 2007); J. Bowyer Bell, The IRA, 
1968-2000:  Analysis of a Secret Army (London:  Frank Cass, 2000); Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (Revised 
edition) (New York:  Palgrave, 2002); Richard English, Armed Struggle:  The History of the IRA (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2003); Kacper Rekowak, Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics:  A 
Comparative Study of the Official and the Provisional IRA (New York:  Routledge, 2011); and Ed 
Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York:  Norton, 2002).  For the relationship of the IRA and the 
Irish Republic, see John Horgan, “From War of Manoeuvre to War of Position:  A Brief History of the 
Provisional IRA and the Irish Republic,” in Combatting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, ed. John Dingley 
(London:  Routledge, 2009), 227-244.  Dingley controversially claims that the scholasticism of the Catholic 
tradition laid the groundwork for the violent path the IRA took during the Troubles.  See James Dingley, 
The IRA:  The Irish Republican Army (Santa Barbara:  Praeger, 2012).  For the general theory of why the 
IRA was successful during “The Troubles” in mobilizing society to support its armed effort, see Sarah 
Elizabeth Parkinson, “Organizing Rebellion:  Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in 
War,” American Political Science Review 107 (3) (2013): 418-432.  Recent research indicates that the 
campaign of violence that the IRA used is generally successful in gaining status in negotiations with 
governments.  See Jakana Thomas, “Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in 
Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science (Forthcoming).   
 
The IRA, Sinn Féin, and a Political Agenda – Henry Patterson attempts to explore the social and political 
ideology of the IRA in The Politics of Illusion:  A Political History of the IRA (London:  Serif, 1997). For 
the emergence of a political agenda after the “long way”, see Brendan O’Brien, The Long War:  The IRA 
and Sinn Féin (2nd ed.) (Syracuse:  Syracuse University Press, 1999).  Brendan O’Leary contends that the 
achievement of the Good Friday Agreement achieved the goals of the IRA and after this they have no 
reason for existence.  See Brendan O’Leary, “The IRA:  Looking Back, Mission Accomplished?’ in Terror, 
Insurgency, and the State:  Ending Protracted Conflicts, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John 
Tirman (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 188-227.  
 
Sept. 22    Implementing the Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland 
                 
Dixon and O’Kane, Ch. 8-9. 
 
Difficulties Implementing the Agreement - For the difficulties implementing The Agreement, see Arthur 
Aughey, The Politics of Northern Ireland:  Beyond the Belfast Agreement (New York:  Routledge, 2005) 
and Jon Tonge, The New Northern Irish Politics? (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).   For an 
overview of the agreement focusing on peacebuilding and transformation of the conflict, see Cornelia 
Albert, The Peacebuilding Elements of the Belfast Agreement and the Transformation of the Northern 
Ireland Conflict (Frankfurt:  Peter Lang, 2009). For an analysis that emphasizes the continuing problems 
and challenges in governing Northern Ireland, see Cillian McGrattan, “Peace Building and the Politics of 
Responsibility:  Governing Northern Ireland,” Peace & Change 39 (4) (2014): 519-541. For a general 
overview of the problem of a stalled peace and difficulty implementing peace, see Roger Mac Ginty, No 
War, No Peace:  The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords (Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). 
 
Sept. 24    Ten Lessons from the Peace Process 
 
White, Ch. 1 – “Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process:  An Introduction” – Timothy J. White       
 
Sept. 29    Lesson Learning from Peace Processes and from Northern Ireland  
 
White, Ch. 2. – “’Look at Northern Ireland’:  Lessons Best Learned at Home” - William A. Hazleton  
 
- Take Home Midterm Exam Due 
 
Lessons and Learning in Peace Processes – Early Approaches – See David P. Dolowitz and David 
Marsh, "Learning from Abroad:  The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making," 
Governance 13 (1) (2000): 5-24; Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy:  Sweeping a Conceptual 
Minefield,” International Organization 48 (2) (1994): 279-312; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest May, 
Thinking In Time:  The Uses of History for Decision-Making (New York:  Free Press, 1986); and Diane 
Stone, "Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines," Politics 19 (1) 
(1999): 56-58. 
 
Lessons and Learning in Peace Processes – Recent Approaches – Oliver P. Richmond in A Post-Liberal 
Peace (New York:  Routledge, 2011) contends that peacebuilding requires one to understand the local 
peculiarities of each conflict.  Efforts to impose a universal liberal peace fail when they fail to take into 
account local circumstances and needs.  He develops this theory more fully in Oliver P. Richmond, Failed 
Statebuilding:  Intervention, the State, and the Dynamics of Peace Formation (New Haven:  Yale 
University Press, 2014). Some critics of peacebuilding suggest that too many resources are invested in the 
aftermath of an agreement, making the concessions necessary for a true peacebuilding process difficult.  
See Michael Barnett, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” International 
Studies Quarterly 58 (3) (2014): 608-620.  For more on the need to appreciate the context of peace 
agreements and settlements, see Catherine Goetze and Berit Bliesermann de Guevera, “Cosmopolitanism 
and the Culture of Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 40 (4) (2014): 771-802;  Ulrich 
Schneckener, “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts:  The Context-Design Nexus,” in Managing and 
Settling Ethnic Conflicts:  Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia, ed. Ulrich 
Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 271-285.  For a critique of 
orthodox peacebuilding and an exploration of alternative peacebuilding that focuses on informal and formal 
actors, institutions and practices and that focuses on both the local as well as global, see David Roberts, 
Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance:  Beyond the Metropolis (New York:  Routledge, 2011).   
 
Lessons and Learning from the Northern Ireland Peace Process – See James Anderson, "Partition, 
Consociation, Border-Crossing:  Some Lessons from the National Conflict in Ireland/Northern Ireland," 
Nations and Nationalism 14 (1) (2008): 85-104; Feargal Cochrane, "From Transition to Transformation in 
Ethnonational Conflict:  Some Lessons from Northern Ireland," Ethnopolitics 11 (2) (2012): 182-203; 
Michael Cox (ed.), The Lessons of Northern Ireland (London:  LSE IDEAS Special Report 008, 2011); 
John Darby, "Borrowing and Lending in Peace Processes," in Contemporary Peacemaking:  Conflict, 
Violence and Peace Processes (2nd ed.), ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (New York:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 339-351; Eamonn O’Kane, “Learning from Northern Ireland?  The Uses and Abuses of 
the Irish ‘Model,’” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 12 (2) (2010): 239-256; and 
Robin Wilson, “Autonomy and Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland:  A Model for Global Export?” 
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 4 (3) (2011): 242-258. For an edited collection that explores from a 
political as well as scholarly analysis how and why identities changed in Ireland and Northern Ireland due 
to the peace process and the Agreement, see John Coakley (ed.), Changing Shades of Orange and Green:  
Redefining the Union and the Nation in Contemporary Ireland (Dublin:  University College Dublin Press, 
2002). 
 
Oct. 1    Lessons Learned by Actors in the Peace Process  
 
Lessons Learned by the British Government – For how the British government learned to deal with the 
IRA in the peace process, see Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “The Longest Negotiation:  British Policy, IRA 
Strategy and the Making of the Northern Ireland Peace Settlement,” Political Studies 63 (1) (2015): 202-
220.  Devashree Gupta claims the British learned to selectively engage with the IRA in “Selective 
Engagement and Its Consequences for Social Movement Organizations:  Lessons from British Policy in 
Northern Ireland,” Comparative Politics 39 (3) (2007): 331-351.  Cunningham finds that separatists that 
divided are more likely to receive concessions.  See Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Divide and 
Conquer or Divide and Concede:  How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?” American 
Political Science Review 105 (2) (2011): 275-297.  Thomas contends that governments do not just negotiate 
with groups as they become more legitimate but also when they use terror attacks during civil wars.  See 
Jakana Thomas, “Rewarding Bad Behavior:  How Governments Respond in Civil War,” American Journal 
of Political Science 58 (4) (2014): 804-818.  For more on what and how the British learned in the peace 
process, see Aaron Edwards, “Interpreting New Labour’s Political Discourse on the Peace Process,” in 
Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution:  Debating Peace in Northern Ireland , ed. Katy Hayward and 
Catherine O’Donnell (London:  Routledge, 2011), 46-61; Frank Millar, "Ireland:  The Peace Process," in 
Blair's Britain, 1997–2007, ed. Anthony Seldon (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2007), 509–
528; Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, “History, Structure and Action in the Settlement of Complex 
Conflicts:  The Northern Ireland Case,” Irish Political Studies 29 (1) (2014): 15-36; and Jennifer Todd, 
“Thresholds of State Change:  Changing British State Institutions and Practices in Northern Ireland after 
Direct Rule,” Political Studies (forthcoming).  For an account of early learning during the initial troubles, 
see William B. Smith, The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis 1979-1973 (Washington:  US 
Institute of Peace, 2011). 
 
Lessons Learned by the British Government Based on Memoirs – For each actor’s own account, see 
Tony Blair, A Journey:  My Political Life (London:  Hutchinson, 2010),  153-199; Mo Mowlam, 
Momentum:  The Struggle for Peace, Politics, and the People (London:  Hodder & Stoughton, 2002); John 
Major; John Major:  The Autobiography (New York:  Harper Collins, 1999), 431-494; and Jonathan 
Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room:  Making Peace in Northern Ireland (London:  Bodley Head, 2008). 
 
Lessons Learned by the Irish Government – See Bertie Ahern, Bertie Ahern:  The Autobiography 
(London:  Arrow Books, 2010), 174-181, 195-201; 210-236; 255; 263-267; 296-301; and 308-313; Ken 
Whelan and Eugene Masterson, Bertie Ahern: Taoiseach and Peacemaker (Edinburgh: Blackwater Press, 
1998); Martin Mansergh, The Legacy of History for Making Peace in Ireland (Cork:  Mercier Press, 2003), 
386-417; Susan McDermott, “The Dimensions of Irish Government Involvement in the Pursuit of a 
Settlement of the Northern Ireland Conflict,” Irish Political Studies 29 (1) (2014): 98-115; Catherine 
O’Donnell, Fianna Fáil, Irish Republicanism and the Northern Ireland Troubles (Dublin:  Irish Academic 
Press, 2006); Catherine O’Donnell, “Finding Consensus:  Political Discourse in the Republic on the 
Troubles and Peace Process,” in Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution:  Debating Peace in Northern 
Ireland , ed. Katy Hayward and Catherine O’Donnell (London:  Routledge, 2011), 32-45; Kevin Rafter, 
Martin Mansergh:  A Biography (Dublin:  New Island, 2002), 149-265; and Albert Reynolds, My 
Autobiography (London:  Transworld Ireland, 2009), 184-377.   
 
Lessons Learned by Northern Irish Nationalists – See Sean Farren, The SDLP:  The Struggle for 
Agreement in Northern Ireland, 1970-2000 (Dublin:  Four Courts Press, 2010); Cillian McGrattan, 
“Modern Irish Nationalism – Ideology, Policymaking, and Path-Dependent Change,” in The Challenges of 
Ethno-Nationalism:  Case Studies in Identity Politics, ed. Adrian Guelke (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 177-190; Claire Mitchell, “From Victims to Equals?  Catholic Responses to Political Change in 
Northern Ireland, Irish Political Studies 18 (1) (2003): 51-71; Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn 
Féin and the SDLP:  From Alienation to Participation (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Niall Ó 
Dochartaigh, “Nation and Neighbourhood:  Nationalist Mobilisation and Local Solidarities in the North of 
Ireland,” in The Challenges of Ethno-Nationalism:  Case Studies in Identity Politics, ed. Adrian Guelke 
(New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 161-176; and Jonathan Tonge “Nationalist Convergence?  The 
Evolution of Sinn Féin and SDLP Politics,” in Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland:  From 
Terrorism to Democratic Politics, ed. Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloomer (eds.), (Dublin:  Irish 
Academic Press, 2008), 59-76.   For an exploration of how scholars and intellectuals have revised Irish 
Nationalism, see Robert Perry, Revisionist Scholarship and Modern Irish Politics (Burlington, VT:  
Ashgate, 2013), 67-98. 
 
Lessons Learned by Irish Nationalists – John Hume – For John Hume’s own memoir, see John Hume, A 
New Ireland:  Politics, Peace and Reconciliation (Boulder:  Roberts Rinehart, 1996). For secondary 
sources and analysis of Hume’s approach to peace, see Peter J. McLoughlin, John Hume and the Revision 
of Irish Nationalism (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2010); Peter J. McLoughlin, 
“’Humespeak’:  The SDLP, Political Discourse and the Peace Process,” in Political Discourse and Conflict 
Resolution:  Debating Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Katy Hayward and Catherine O’Donnell (London:  
Routledge, 2011), 77-92; Gerard Murray, John Hume and the SDLP:  Impact and Survival in Northern 
Ireland (Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 1998); and Paul Routledge, John Hume:  A Biography (London:  
Harper Collins, 1998). 
 
Lessons Learned by Irish Republicans – See Jocelyn Evans and Jonathan Tonge, “From Abstentionism 
to Enthusiasm:  Sinn Féin, Nationalist Electors and Support for Devolved Power-sharing in Northern 
Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 28 (1) (2013): 39-57; Martyn Frampton, The Long March:  The Political 
Strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981-2007 (London:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Kevin E. Grisham, “Provisional 
Irish Republican Army/Sinn Féin,” in Transforming Violent Political Movements:  Rebels Today, What 
Tomorrow? (New York:  Routledge, 2014), 121-154; John Horgan, “From War of Manoeuvre to War of 
Position:  A Brief History of the Provisional IRA and the Irish Republic,” in Combating Terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, ed. James Dingley (London:  Routledge, 2009), 227-244; Ian McAllister, “’The Armalite 
and the Ballot Box’:  Sinn Féin’s Electoral Strategy in Northern Ireland,” Electoral Studies 23 (1) (2004): 
123-142; Tommy McKearney, The Provisional IRA:  From Insurrection to Parliament (London:  Pluto, 
2011); Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP:  From Alienation to Participation 
(New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “Republicanism Domesticated?  All-Ireland 
Politics in an Age of Austerity,” The Political Quarterly 83 (2) (2012): 256-264; Catherine O’Donnell, 
“The Evolution of Irish Republicanism and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland,” in Transforming the 
Peace Process in Northern Ireland:  From Terrorism to Democratic Politics, ed. Aaron Edwards and 
Stephen Bloomer (eds.), (Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 2008), 44-58; and Andrew Silke, “Rebel’s 
Dilemma:  The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and Paramilitary Vigilantism in 
Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11 (1) (1999): 55-93.  For a critical look at how Sinn 
Féin changed their positions in the peace process, see Henry McDonald, Gunsmoke and Mirrors:  How 
Sinn Féin Dressed up Defeat as Victory (Dublin:  Gill and Macmillan, 2009).   
 
Lessons Learned by Gerry Adams – For Gerry Adams’ perspective, see Gerry Adams, A Farther Shore:  
Ireland’s Long Road to Peace (New York:  Random House, 2005) and An Irish Eye (Dingle:  Brandon, 
2007).  For Adams earlier vision, see Gerry Adams, Free Ireland:  Towards a Lasting Peace (Dingle:  
Brandon, 1986).  Elena Mastors uses Hermann’s personality-at-a-distance method to explore Adams’ 
negotiating behavior in “Gerry Adams and the Northern Ireland Peace Process:  A Research Note,” 
Political Psychology 21 (4) (2000): 839-846.   For a biography of McGuinness and his political 
transformation, see Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnston, Martin McGuinness:  From Guns to Government 
(Edinburgh:  Mainstream, 2001).   
 
Lessons Learned by “Dissident” Republicans – Not all Republicans agree with Sinn Féin’s peace 
agenda.  See Martyn Frampton, Legion of the Rearguard:  Dissident Irish Republicanism  (Dublin:  Irish 
Academic Press, 2010); John Horgan, Divided We Stand:  The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland’s 
Dissident Terrorists (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2013); Andrew Sanders, Inside the IRA:  
Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Jon 
Tonge, “’They Haven’t Gone Away, You Know’:  Irish Republican ‘Dissidents’ and ‘Armed Struggle,’” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (3) (2004): 671-693; and Robert W. White, “Structural Identity Theory 
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make enduring settlements, see Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace:  Do Hawks or Doves 
Deliver the Olive Branch? International Organization 59 (1) (2005): 1-38.  The Northern Ireland 
experience conforms to the more general argument that moderate voters will vote for more extreme parties 
and candidates to achieve what they perceive as balance in parliament or better representation of their 
position. See Orit Kedar, “When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties:  Policy Balancing in 
Parliamentary Elections,” American Political Science Review 99 (2) (2005): 185-199. 
 
 Oct. 20-27   Diplomacy and Keys to Success in the Northern Ireland Peace Process                  
 
Incorporating Extremists in the Northern Ireland Peace Process – See Aaron Edwards, “Talking to 
Terrorists:  Political Violence and Peace Processes in the Contemporary World,” in Transforming the 
Peace Process in Northern Ireland:  From Terrorism to Democratic Politics (Dublin:  Irish Academic 
Press, 2008), 195-211; Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans, and Brendan O’Leary, “Extremist Outbidding in 
Ethnic Party Systems is Not Inevitable:  Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 57 (2) 
(2009): 397–421; Gavin Moore, Neophytos Loizides, Nukhet A. Sandal & Alexandros Lordos, ”Winning 
Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus,” West European Politics 37 (1) 
(2014): 159-181; Anthony Oberschall and L. Kendall Palmer, “The Failure of Moderate Politics:  The Case 
of Northern Ireland,” in Power Sharing:  New Challenges for Divided Societies, ed. Ian O’Flynn and David 
Russell (London:  Pluto Press, 2005), 77-91; and Jennifer Todd, “Thresholds of State Change:  Changing 
British State Institutions and Practices in Northern Ireland after Direct Rule,” Political Studies 
(forthcoming).  For the need to incorporate former combatants into the peacebuilding process, see Claire 
Mitchell, “The Limits of Legitimacy:  Former Loyalist Combatants and Peace-Building in Northern 
Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 23 (1) (2008): 1-19. 
 
Is Diplomacy the Key to Peace? – For how diplomacy is the key to peace, see Charles A. Kupchan, How 
Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2010).  
Strong governments can help solve civil conflicts.  See Clayton L. Thyne, “Information, Commitment, and 
Intra-War Bargaining:  The Effect of Governmental Constraints on Civil War Duration,” International 
Studies Quarterly 56 (2) (2012): 307-321.  Diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed when warring 
parties see the results of battles in terms that suggest that diplomacy is a good option. See J. Michael Greig, 
“Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement, and Openings for Diplomacy,” International 
Studies Quarterly (Forthcoming). Even how cease fires are arranged may help determine the durability of 
peace.  See Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” 
International Organization 57 (2) (2003): 337-372.   
 
Diplomatic Settlements and their Effectiveness – For how the quality of the diplomatic settlement 
influences the likelihood of peace persisting, see Ramzi Badran, “Intrastate Peace Agreements and the 
Durability of Peace,” Conflict Management and Peace Science (Forthcoming).  Diplomatic settlements are 
more likely to endure if the parties do not see an advantage to renegotiating the settlement.  See Suzanne 
Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace:  Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and 
Renegotiating the Terms,” American Journal of Political Science 43 (3) (1999): 912-934 
 
Diplomacy Requires Domestic and International Bargaining - See James D. Fearon, “Domestic 
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88 
(3) (1994): 577-592 and Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:  The Logic of Two-Level 
Games,” International Organization 42 (3) (1988): 727-460.  For more on why domestic changes can lead 
to peace or the breakdown of rivalry, see Eric W. Cox, Why Enduring Rivalries Do – Or Don’t – End 
(Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2010).  For a recent effort to explain the interaction of domestic actors and 
efforts to build peace after an agreement, see Michael Barnett, Songying Fang, and Christopher Zürcher, 
“Compromised Peacebuilding,” International Studies Quarterly (Forthcoming). For the context of Northern 
Ireland, see Cathy Gormley-Heenan, "Abdicated and Assumed Responsibilities:  The Multiple Roles of 
Political Leadership During the Northern Ireland Peace Process," Civil Wars 7 (3) (2005): 195-218. Often, 
local actors resist international efforts at peace making, see Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, 
“Introduction – Towards a Post-Liberal Peace:  Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, 
Agency and Autonomy,” in Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds.), Hybrid Forms of Peace:  From 
Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1-38.  
Lying and Honorable Deception in Peace Processes – John J. Mearsheimer emphasizes how lying to 
one’s public can undermine confidence in government and corrupt domestic politics in Why Leaders Lie 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 2011), especially 13 and 85-86. Robert Jubb and A. Faik Kurtulmus 
in “No Country for Honest Men:  Political Philosophers and Real Politics,” Political Studies 60 (3) (2012): 
539-556 and Sorin Baiasu (ed.), Sincerity in Politics and International Relations (New York:  Routledge, 
2014) explores the philosophical justification for lying in politics.  Sometimes, leaders and the public 
deceive themselves.  See Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, “Liars or Self-Deceived? Reflections on Political 
Deception,” Political Studies (Forthcoming). 
 
Lying and Deception in the Northern Ireland Peace Process – Cathy Gormley-Heenan describes the 
“chameleonic leadership” of the political elites who negotiated the Agreement in 1998 as shifting according 
to the opinion of others and the climate that surrounded them in Political Leadership and the Northern 
Ireland Peace Process:  Role, Capacity and Effect (New York:  Palgrave:  2007).   For analysis that 
stresses more than Gormley-Heenan’s description of the chameleon like nature of the leaders, see Arthur 
Aughey, “The Art and Effect of Political Lying in Northern Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 17 (2) (2002): 
1-16; Paul Dixon, “Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation?  The Choreography of the Northern Ireland 
Peace Process,” Political Studies 50 (3) (2002): 725-741; and Paul Dixon, “’There is Nothing Politically 
Right that is Morally Wrong’?  Beyond Realism and Idealism in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” Irish 
Political Studies 29 (2) (2014): 236-257.  For how misleading the public caused difficulties implementing 
the Agreement, see G. K. Peatling, The Failure of the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Dublin:  Irish 
Academic Press, 2004), 94-105.   
 
Keeping the Peace Process Going – Momentum and Commitment – For the need for groups who have 
committed to peace to continue to see operating under the terms of the peace agreement is in their interest, 
see Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” International Organization 59 (2) 
(2005): 261-292.  To see how incentives versus penalties worked in the context of Northern Ireland, see 
Eamonn O’Kane, “To Cajole or Compel?  The Use of Incentives and Penalties in Northern Ireland’s Peace 
Process,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 4 (3) (2011): 272-284.  For the role constructive ambiguity 
played in this process, see John Dingley, “Constructive Ambiguity and the Peace Process in Northern 
Ireland,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 13 (1) (2005): 1-23 and David Mitchell, "Cooking 
the Fudge:  Constructive Ambiguity and the Implementation of the Northern Ireland Agreement," Irish 
Political Studies 24 (3) (2009): 321-336. 
 
Marginalizing Spoilers – See Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace:  The Politics 
of Extremist Violence,” International Organization 56 (2) (2002): 263-296; Desiree Nilsson and Mimmi S. 
Kovacs, “Revisiting and Elusive Concept:  A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in Peace Processes,” 
International Studies Review 13 (4) (2011): 606-626; Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace 
Processes,” International Security 22 (2) (1997): 5-53; and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, “Reframing the Spoiler 
Debate in Peace Processes,” in Contemporary Peacemaking:  Conflict, Peace Processes, and Post-war 
Reconstruction, ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 159-177.  
For how a small number of ethnic radicals can undermine peace, see Nicholas Sambonis and Moses Shayo, 
“Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict,” American Political Science Review 107 (2) (2013): 294-325. 
For how some liberal attempts at peacemaking can create spoilers in the secular age, see Joyce Dalsheim, 
Producing Spoilers:  Peacemaking and the Production of Enmity in a Secular Age (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
 
Spoilers and the Northern Ireland Peace Process - See Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, “The 
Perils of Profiling:  Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” International 
Security 31 (3) (2006/2007): 7-40.  T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Patrick T. Brandt, and Jason Michael 
Quinn in “When Civil Wars Recur:  Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars, International Studies 
Perspective 12 (2) (2011): 171-180 contend that while negotiated settlements may be initially be more 
fragile than military victories those that bring stable regimes and marginalize spoilers are more likely to 
endure.  Stacie E. Goddard in “Brokering Peace:  Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (3) (2012): 501-515 claims that the presence of “brokers” are 
the key to undermining spoilers in peace processes, specifically in the case of Northern Ireland.   
 
Deadlines and No Alternatives – Prospect Theory – The use of a deadline in the Northern Irish 
experience conforms to the general finding that time pressure helps yield broad agreements but defies the 
more common trend that time pressures negatively affect complex negotiations and tend to yield less 
durable settlements. See Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining:  The Implications of 
Prospect Theory for International Conflict,” International Political Science Review 41 (2) (1996): 87-112 
and Marco Pinfari, “Time to Agree:  Is Time Pressure Good for Peace Negotiations?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 55 (5) (2011): 683-709.  For a longer elaboration of Pinfari’s argument, see Marco Pinfari, 
Peace Negotiations and Time:  Deadline Diplomacy in Territorial Disputes (London:  Routledge, 2013).  
Also see C. De Dreu, “Time Pressure and Closing of the Mind in Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Making Processes 91 (2) (2003): 280-295.   
 
Prospect Theory in Northern Ireland – The lack of an alternative to the Agreement helped garner 
support for it.  See Landon E. Hancock, “There is No Alternative:  Prospect Theory, the Yes Campaign and 
Selling the Good Friday Agreement,” Irish Political Studies 26 (1) (2011): 95-116 and Landon E. Hancock, 
Joshua N. Weiss, and Glenn M. E. Duerr, “Prospect Theory and the Framing of the Good Friday 
Agreement,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 28 (2) (2011): 183-203.  Some argue that prospect theory is 
limited in explaining the Northern Ireland Peace Process compared to expected utility models.  See Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita, Rose McDermott, and Emily Cope, “The Expected Prospects for Peace in Northern 
Ireland,” International Interactions 27 (2) (2001): 129-167.   
 
The Media and Promoting the Peace Process – For the general role of the media in peacebuilding, see J. 
P. Singh, “Media and Peacebuilding,” in Integrated Peacebuilding:  Innovative Approaches to 
Transforming Conflict (Boulder:  Westview, 2013), 225-247.  For the role of the media influencing third 
party intervention (e.g. US in Northern Ireland), see Sam R. Bell, Richard Frank, Paul Macharia, 
“Passenger or Driver?  A Cross-National Examination of Media Coverage and Civil War Interventions,” 
International Interactions 39 (5) (2013): 646-671.   
 
The Media’s Role in the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process – For the role of the media in 
promoting the Agreement and the peace process in Northern Ireland see Gareth Ivory, “The Provision of 
Irish Television in Northern Ireland:  A Slow British-Irish Success Story,” Irish Political Studies 29 (1) 
(2014): 134-153; Greg McLaughlin and Stephen Baker, “The Media, the Peace Process and ‘Bread and 
Butter’ Politics,” Political Quarterly 83 (2) (2012): 292-298; Greg McLaughlin and Stephen Baker, The 
Propaganda of Peace (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2010); David Miller, “The Media, 
Propaganda, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” in Media in Ireland:  Issues in Broadcasting, ed. 
Declan Kiberd (Dublin:  Four Courts Press, 2002), 114-129; Bill Rolston, “Facing Reality:  The Media, the 
Past and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland,” Crime, Media, Culture 3 (3) (2007): 345-364; 
Graham Spencer, “Keeping the Peace?  Politics, Television News and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 
Irish Journal of Sociology 10 (2) (2001): 57-76; Graham Spencer, Disturbing the Peace?  Politics, 
Television News and the Northern Ireland Peace Process (London:  Ashgate, 2000); and Graham Spencer, 
“The Impact of Television News on the Northern Ireland Peace Negotiations,” Media, Culture & Society 26 
(5) (2004): 603-623.  For an earlier analysis of the role of the media in Northern Ireland, see Bill Rolston 
and David Miller (eds.), War and Words:  the Northern Ireland Media Reader (Belfast:  Beyond the Pale, 
1996).   
 
Intermediaries and Track Two Diplomacy in Peace Processes – See Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, 
Conducting Track II Peacemaking (Washington:  U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010); Diana Chigas, 
“Negotiating Intractable Conflicts:  The Contributions of Unofficial Intermediaries,” in Grasping the 
Nettle:  Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 
Aall (Washington:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 123-158.  Intermediaries’ intervention is 
enhanced when they support state efforts.  See Tobias Böhmelt, “The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy 
Strategies in Third-Party Interventions,” Journal of Peace Research 47 (2) (2010): 167–178.  
 
Intermediaries and Track Two Diplomacy in Northern Ireland – See Paul Arthur, “’Quiet Diplomacy 
and Personal Conversation’:  Track Two Diplomacy and the Search for a Settlement in Northern Ireland,” 
in After the Good Friday Agreement:  Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland, ed. Joseph Ruane 
and Jennifer Todd (Dublin:  University College Dublin Press, 1999), 71-95 and Niall Ó Dochartaigh, 
“Together in the Middle: Back-channel Negotiation in the Irish Peace Process,” Journal of Peace Research 
48 (6) (2011): 767–780.   
 
Creativity and Conflict Resolution – Arai contends that successful diplomatic efforts that yield conflict 
resolution require creativity.  See Tatsushi Arai, Creativity and Conflict Resolution:  Alternative Pathways 
to Peace (New York:  Routledge, 2009). 
 
Oct. 29  Improving Security:  Police Reform and Decommissioning in Peace Processes 
 
White, Ch. 6 – “The Transformation of Policing in Post Conflict Societies:  Lessons from the Northern 
Ireland Experience” – John Doyle 
 
Security after Conflict - For a good overview of the problems of providing security after a peace 
agreement or after the war, see Michael J. Boyle, Violence after War:  Explaining Instability in Post-
Conflict States (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014) and Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, Why 
Peace Processes Fail:  Negotiating Insecurity after Civil War (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2015). The 
problem of establishing the rule of law or law and order after a conflict has proven to be extremely difficult 
and challenging in post-conflict peacebuilding operations. See Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, “The 
Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record,” International Studies Quarterly 58 (2) 
(2014): 405-417.  
 
The Challenge of Ontological Security - For the challenge of what scholars see as ontological security in 
the modern world, see Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism:  Self, Identity, and the 
Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25 (5) (2004):  741-767 and Jennifer Mitzen, 
“Ontological Security in World Politics:  State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of 
International Relations 12 (3) (2006): 341-370.  For the link between narrative, ontological security and 
foreign policy change, see Jelena Subotić, “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis (Forthcoming). For an application of ontological security theory to Northern 
Ireland, see Sean Kay, “Ontological Security and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 33 (2) (2012): 236-263. 
 
The Role of Security and Police Reform in Peacemaking – David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The 
Police in War:  Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2010); 
Adrian Guelke, Politics in Deeply Divided Society (Cambridge:  Polity, 2012), 55-76; Caroline Hartzell, 
“Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 
(1) (1999): 3-22; Mark Knight, “DDR and SSR:  Conventional Approaches to International Peacebuilding 
Assistance,” in Postwar Security Transitions:  Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts, ed. 
Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann, and Katrin Planta (London:  Routledge, 2012), 17-29; Eric D. 
Patterson, Ending Wars Well:  Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conflict (New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 2012), 38-66; Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Security Sector 
Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006); William Stanley 
and Charles T. Call, “Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars,” in Contemporary Peacemaking:  
Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction (2nd ed.), ed. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginny 
(New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 300-312.   
 
Police Reform in Northern Ireland – See Brice Dickson, “New Beginnings?  Policing and Human Rights 
after the Conflict,” in A Farewell to Arms?  Beyond the Good Friday Agreement (2nd ed.), ed. Michael 
Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2006), 170-186; John 
Doyle, Policing the Narrow Ground:  Lessons from the Transformation of Policing in Northern Ireland 
(Dublin:  Royal Irish Academy, 2010); Roz Goldie and Joanne Murphy, “Embedding the Peace Process:  
The Role of Leadership, Change and Government in Implementing Key Reforms in Policing and Local 
Government in Northern Ireland,” International Journal of Peace Studies 15  (2) (2010): 33-58; Paddy 
Hillyard and Mike Tomlinson, “Patterns of Policing and Policing Patten,” Journal of Law and Society 27 
(3) (2000): 394–415; Kieran McEvoy and John Morison, “Beyond the ‘Constitutional Moment’:  Law, 
Transition, and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland,” Fordham International Law Journal 26 (2003): 961-
995; Jon Moran, Policing the Peace in Northern Ireland:  Politics, Crime and Security after the Belfast 
Agreement (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2008); Joanne Murphy, Policing for Peace in 
Northern Ireland :  Change, Conflict and Community Confidence (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); 
Robert Perry, “The Devolution of Policing in Northern Ireland:  Politics and Reform,” Politics 31 (3) 
(2011): 167-178; Mary O’Rawe, “Policing Change:  To Reform or Not to Transform,” in Northern Ireland 
after the Troubles:  A Society in Transition, ed. Colin Coulter and Michael Murray (Manchester:  
Manchester University Press, 2008), 110-132; Desmond Rea and Robin Masefield, Policing in Northern 
Ireland:  A Bew Beginning (Liverpool:  Liverpool University Press, 2014); and Joanne Wright and Keith 
Bryett, Policing and Conflict in Northern Ireland (London:  Macmillan, 2000).  For a radical critique of 
police reform in Ireland, see Barry J. Ryan, “The Logic of a Justified Hope: The Dialectic of Police Reform 
in Northern Ireland,” Capital & Class 32 (95) (2008): 83-107. 
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Peacebuilding – See Nat J. Colletta, 
Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration:  Lessons and 
Liabilities in Reconstruction,” in When States Fail:  Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2004); 170-181; Macarten Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, 
“Demobilization and Reintegration,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (4) (2007): 531-567; Chandra 
Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, “DDR and Transitional Justice:  Bridging the Divide?” Conflict, 
Security & Development 9 (2009): 455-474; Robert Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction:  Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (Abingdon:  Routledge, 2009); Alpaslan 
Özerdem, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” in Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, 
ed. Roger Mac Ginty (London:  Routledge, 2013), 225-236; Lars Waldorf, “Just Peace?  Integrating DDR 
and Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground, ed. Chandra Lehha 
Sriram, Jemima García-Godos, Johanna Herman, and Olga Martin-Ortega (London:  Routledge, 2013), 62-
80.   
 
Decommissioning and Peace Consolidation in Northern Ireland – For assessments of the person 
responsible for decommissioning in Northern Ireland, see John de Chastelain, “The Good Friday 
Agreement and Northern Ireland,” in Herding Cats:  Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. 
Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington:  United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1999).  435-468; John de Chastelain, The Northern Ireland Peace Process and the Impact of 
Decommissioning (Dublin:  Working Papers in British-Irish Studies, No. 8, Institute for British-Irish 
Studies, University College Dublin, 2001); and John de Chastelain, “The Northern Ireland Peace Process 
and the Impact of Decommissioning,” in From Political Violence to Negotiated Settlement:  The Winding 
Path to Peace in Twentieth-Century Ireland, ed. Maurice J. Bric and John Coakley (Dublin:  University 
College Dublin Press, 2004), 154-178.  Much like the need for police reform, the decommissioning process 
attempted to depoliticize the issue and create credibility with an international decommissioning body, see 
especially Michael Kerr, “Internationalising the Arms Issue:  The Politics of Decommissioning in Northern 
Ireland and Lebanon,” in Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland:  From Terrorism to 
Democratic Politics, ed. Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloomer (Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 2008), 212-
228.  Also see Kris Brown and Corinna Hauswedell. Burying the Hatchet: The Decommissioning of 
Paramilitary Arms in Northern Ireland (Bonn:  International Centre for Conversion, 2002); Roger Mac 
Ginty, “’Biting the Bullet': Decommissioning in the Transition from War to Peace in Northern Ireland,” 
Irish Studies in International Affairs 10 (1999): 237-247; Colin McInnes, “A Farewell to Arms?  
Decommissioning and the Peace Process,” in A Farewell to Arms?  Beyond the Good Friday Agreement 
(2
nd
 ed.), ed. Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
2006), 154-169; David Mitchell, “Sticking to Their Guns?  The Politics of Arms Decommissioning in 
Northern Ireland, 1998-2007,” Contemporary British History 24 (3) (2010): 341-361; Eamonn O’Kane, 
“Decommissioning and the Peace Process:  Where Did It Come From and Why Did It Stay So Long?” Irish 
Political Studies 22 (1) (2007): 81-101; Kirsten E. Schulze and M.L.R. Smith, “Decommissioning and 
Paramilitary Strategy in Northern Ireland:  A Problem Compared,” Journal of Strategic Studies 23 (4) 
(2000): 77-106; Marie Smyth, “The Process of Demilitarisation and the Reversibility of the Peace Process 
in Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (3) (2004): 544-566; and Dawn Walsh, “The 
Irish Government and Decommissioning in Northern Ireland:  Exercising Best Practice for External 
Ethnonational Guarantors?” Irish Studies in International Affairs 24 (2013): 311-329. To place the 
decommissioning process in a larger process of political disengagement of terrorists, see Neil Ferguson, 
Mark Burgess, and Ian Hollywood, “Leaving Violence Behind:  Disengaging from Politically Motivated 
Violence in Northern Ireland,” Political Psychology 36 (2) (2015): 199-214. 
 
Nov. 3     Human and Gender Based Security 
 
Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect – Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse:  Understanding Human Security,” Scandinavian Political Studies 35 (1) 
(2012): 71-96; Mary Kaldor, Human Security:  Reflections on Globalization and Intervention (Cambridge:  
Polity Press, 2007); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, Human Security:  Concepts and 
Implications (New York:  Routledge, 2007); and  Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect:  Ending 
Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington:  Brookings Institution Press, 2008).  For an 
assessment of how humanitarian intervention has emerged as the Responsibility to Protect, see Dorota 
Gierycz. “From Humanitarian Intervention (HI) to Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” Criminal Justice 
Ethics 29 (2) (2010): 110-128.  For a four volume assessment of Human Security see Taylor Owen, Human 
Security (Los Angeles:  Sage, 2013). For an approach emphasizing the need for peacebuilding to provide 
human security, see Lisa Schirch, Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning:  Toward a 
Participatory Approach to Human Security (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2013). For an early critique of 
human security, see Roland Paris, “Human Security:  Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26 
(2) (2001):  87-102.  For a more contemporary and radical critique, see Mahmood Mamdani, 
“Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4 (1) (2010): 53-
67. 
 
Human Security and Multilateralism – Human security is often linked to multilateral efforts.  See S. Neil 
McFarlane and Yuen Foong Khang, Human Security and the UN:  A Critical History (Bloomington:  
Indiana University Press, 2006) and Sandra J. MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, A Decade 
of Human Security:  Global Governance and New Multilateralisms (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate, 2006); For 
the need for human security and the responsibility to get beyond a state-centric model of IR, see Daniel 
Warner, “Responsibility to Protect and the Limits of Imagination,” The International Journal of Human 
Rights 7 (3) (2003): 154-159.  For recent critiques of the human security approach and the responsibility to 
protect in multilateral contexts, see Aidan Hehir, “The Responsibility to Protect in International Political 
Discourse: Encouraging Statement of Intent or Illusory Platitudes?” International Journal of Human Rights 
15 (8) (2011): 1331-1348; Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Community Security:  Human Security at 21,” 
Contemporary Politics, 21 (1) (2015): 53-69; and Roland Paris. “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the 
Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention, International Peacekeeping, “ 21 (5) (2014): 
569-603.  For a response to Paris’ critique of the Responsibility to Protect, see Ramesh Thakur, “R2P's 
‘Structural’ Problems:  A Response to Roland Paris,” International Peacekeeping 22 (1) (2015): 11-25. 
 
Gender and Security – For an overview, see Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Women Building Peace:  What 
They Do, Why It Matters (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2007); Maria O’Reilly, “Gender and Peacebuilding,” in 
Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, ed. Roger Mac Ginty (London:  Routledge, 2013), 57-80;  Laura 
Sjoberg, Gender, War, and Conflict (Cambridge:  Polity, 2014); and Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global 
Conflict:  Toward a Feminist Theory of War (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2013).  For an 
overall analysis including a chapter on women in Northern Ireland, see Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P. 
Williams, Women at War, Women Building Peace:  Challenging Gender Norms (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 
2013).  To see Kaufman and Williams’ earlier work, see Women and War:  Gender Identity and Activism in 
Times of Conflict (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2010). 
 
Gender and Security in Northern Ireland – For an earlier historical examination of women’s role in 
Northern Ireland, see Rosemary Sales, Divided:  Gender, Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland 
(London:  Routledge, 1997).  For the more recent work on gender and security in Northern Ireland, see 
Siobhan Byrne, “Women and the Transition from Conflict in Northern Ireland:  Lessons for Peace-building 
in Israel/Palestine,” IBIS Working Papers, 89, (2009) available at 
http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/wp2009/89_byrne%20rev%201.pdf; Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, “Women in 
Northern Ireland Politics:  Gender and the Politics of Peace-building in the New Legislative Assembly,” 
Irish Political Studies 18 (1) (2003): 72–96; Maria-Adrianna Deiana, “Women’s Citizenship in Northern 
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Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” Geopolitics 14 (4) (2009): 630-52; Sean Byrne, Christopher 
Cunningham, Eyob Fissuh, “Getting to Peace:  The Role of the European Union Peace I Fund in Building 
the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland,” Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 16 (2) (2008): 64-95; 
Sean Byrne, Eyob Fissuh, Chuck Thiessen, Cynthia Irvin and Pauline Tennent, “The Role of IFI and EU 
Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and Sectarianism in Northern Ireland,” International Politics 47 (2) 
(2010): 229-50; Sean Byrne, Chuck Thiessen, and Eyob Fissuh, “Economic Assistance and Peacebuilding 
in Northern Ireland,” Peace Research:  The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies 39 (1-2) 
(2007): 7-22;Sean Byrne, Eyob Fissuh, Chuck Thiessen, Cynthia Irvin, and Pauline Tennent, “The Role of 
the International Fund for Ireland and the European Union Peace II Fund in Reducing Violence and 
Sectarianism in Northern Ireland,” International Politics 47 (2) (2010): 229-250; Sean Byrne, Olga 
Skarlato, Eyob Fissuh, and Cynthia Irvin, “Building Trust and Goodwill in Northern Ireland and the Border 
Counties:  The Impact of Economic Aid on Peace Process,” Irish Political Studies 24 (3) (2009): 337-363; 
Rob Kevlihan, Aid, Insurgencies and Conflict Transformation (New York:  Routledge, 2013), 29-51; and 
Andrew Wilson, ‘’’Doing the Business’:  Aspects of the Clinton Administration’s Economic Support for 
the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1994–2000,” Journal of Conflict Studies 23 (1) (2003): 155–176. A 
more sceptical view of EU funding is provided in James Hughes, “Paying for Peace:  Comparing the EU’s 
Role in the Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kosovo,” in EU Conflict Management, ed. James Hughes 
(London:  Routledge, 2010), 12-31. 
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Boundary Settlement and Peace – See Douglas M. Gibler, Marc L. Hutchison, Steven V. Miller, 
“Individual Identity Attachments and International Conflict: The Importance of Territorial Threat,” 
Comparative Political Studies 45 (12) (2012): 1655-1683; Rongxing Guo, Territorial Disputes and 
Conflict Management:  The Art of Avoiding War (New York:  Routledge, 2012); Paul Huth, Standing Your 
Ground:  Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 
1996); Stephen Kocs, “Territorial Dispute and Interstate War, 1945-1987,” Journal of Politics 57 (1) 
(1995): 159-175; David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Territorial Decentralization and Civil War 
Settlements,” in Sustainable Peace:  Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and 
Donald Rothchild (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2005), 109-132;  Andrew P. Owsiak, “Signing Up for 
Peace:  International Boundary Agreements, Democracy, and Militarized Interstate Conflict,” International 
Studies Quarterly 56 (1) (2012): 51-66; Andrew P. Owsiak and Toby J. Rider, “Clearing the Hurdle:  
Border Settlement and Rivalry Termination,” Journal of Politics (Forthcoming); and Krista E. Wiegand 
and Emilia J. Powell, “Past Experience, Quest for the Best Forum, and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve 
Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (1) (2011): 33-59.  For a general overview of 
borders and conflict, see Harvey Starr, On Geopolitics:  Space, Place, and International Relations (Boulder:  
Paradigm, 2013), 113-136.  For how territorial disputes are often used to gain concessions, see Krista E. 
Wiegand, Ending Territorial Disputes:  Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement 
(Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 2011).  
 
Boundaries and Peace – For the importance of territory as a bases for conflict historically and how this 
basis of conflict has evolved, see Dominic D. P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War:  The 
Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” International Security 38 (3) (2013/2014): 7-38.   For the development 
of the norm of territorial integrity, see Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm:  International 
Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55 (2) (2001): 215-250.  For why states 
should use territory for the purposes of legitimacy, see Paulina Ochoa Espejo, “People, Territory, and 
Legitimacy in Democratic States,” American Journal of Political Science 58 (2) (2014): 466-478.  For 
analysis linking borders with identities, see Jennifer Bickham Mendez and Nancy A. Naples, “Contests 
over Territory, Nation, Identity, and Belonging,” in Border Politics:  Social Movements, Collective 
Identities and Globalization, ed. Nancy A. Naples and Jennifer Bickham Mendez (New York:  New York 
University Press, 2015), 1-37;  Jennifer Bickham Mendez and Nancy A. Naples, “Border Politics:  Creating 
a Dialogue between Border Studies and Social Movements,” in Border Politics:  Social Movements, 
Collective Identities and Globalization, ed. Nancy A. Naples and Jennifer Bickham Mendez (New York 
New York University Press, 2015), 357-379; and Jennifer Jackson and Lina Molokotos-Liederman (eds.), 
Nationalism, Ethnicity and Boundaries:  Conceptualising and Understanding Identity through Boundary 
Approaches (New York:  Routledge, 2015) . For  a critical approach to the study of world politics that 
emphasizes the need to move beyond a territorial understanding of international relations, see R.B.J. 
Walker, After the Globe, Before the World (London:  Routledge, 2010). 
 
Boundary Peace or Democratic Peace - One recent article suggests that it is establishing democracy not 
stable borders that causes peace between states.  See Johann Park and Michael Colaresi, “Safe Across the 
Border: The Continued Significance of the Democratic Peace When Controlling for Stable Borders,” 
International Studies Quarterly 58 (1) (2014): 118-125.  However, recent research also highlights how high 
level of conflict over territory diminishes the pacifying tendencies of democracies tending not to fight each 
other.  See Johann Park and Patrick James, “Democracy, Territory, and Armed Conflict, 1919-1995,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 11 (1) (2015): 85-107.  Gibler contends that the democratic peace can be better 
understood by the creation of stable borders.  See Douglas M. Gibler, “Contiguous States, Stable Borders, 
and the Peace Between Democracies,” International Studies Quarterly 58 (1) (2014): 126-129.  For a 
longer elaboration of Gibler’s argument, see Douglas M. Gibler, The Territorial Peace:  Borders, State 
Development, and International Conflict (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2012).  Owsiak has 
recently found it is boundary settlement, not the democratic peace, which accounts for much of the peaceful 
relations that has been achieved in states.  See Andrew P. Owsiak, “Democratization and International 
Border Agreements,” Journal of Politics 75 (3) (2013): 717-729. Recent research indicates that the 
relationship between democracy and peace may be endogenous or reciprocal so that perhaps border 
settlement might be a more independent variable effecting stable peace.  See Jason Enia and Patrick James, 
“Regime Type, Peace, and Reciprocal Effects,” Social Science Quarterly (Forthcoming). 
 
Is Partition the Problem or the Solution? – See Thomas Chapman and Philip G. Roeder, “Partition as a 
Solution to Wars of Nationalism:  The Importance of Institutions,” American Political Science Review 101 
(4) (2007): 677-691; Alexander Downes, “More Borders, Less Conflict:  Partition as a Solution to Ethnic 
Civil War,” SAIS Review 26 (2) (2006): 49-61; Michael C. Horowitz, Alex Weisinger, and Carter Johnson, 
“The Limits to Partition,” International Security 33 (4) (2009): 203-210; James Hughes, “Debating 
Partition:  Evaluating the Standard Justifications,” in Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, ed. Karll 
Cordell and Stefan Wolff (New York:  Routledge, 2011), 140-157; Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and 
Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20 (4) (1996): 136-175; and Nicholas 
Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War:  An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” 
World Politics 52 (4) (2000): 437-483. The need to go beyond partition as a means to end civil wars is 
supported in Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl in “What’s in a Line? Is Partition a Solution 
to Civil War?” International Security 34 (2) (2009): 82-118.   
 
Boundary Settlement and Peace in the Northern Ireland Context – For a historical, political and 
cultural examination of the border see Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds.), The Irish Border:  
History, Politics, Culture (Liverpool:  Liverpool University Press, 1999).  For how the border amounted to 
a “violent frontier” during the Troubles, see Henry Patterson, Irelands Violent Frontier:  The Border and 
Anglo-Irish Relations during the Troubles (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  For more recent 
efforts to understand the role of border settlement in the context of the Northern Ireland peace process, see 
Stacie E. Goddard, “Uncommon Ground:  Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” 
International Organization 60 (1) (2006): 35-68; Markus Kornprobst, “Argumentation and Compromise:  
Ireland’s Selection of the Territorial Status Quo Norm,” International Organization 61 (1) (2007): 69-98 
[For a longer elaboration of Kornprobst’s theory of the movement away from irredentism in Ireland, see his 
book, Irredentism in European Politics:  Argumentation, Compromise and Norms (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), especially Ch. 5 and 6]; and Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “Territoriality and Order in the 
North of Ireland,” Irish Political Studies 26 (3) (2011): 313-328.  For how the peace process has brought 
cooperation across the border, see John Coakley and Liam O’Dowd (eds.), Crossing the Border:  New 
Relationships Between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 2007); 
Catherine Nash, Bryonie Reid, “Border Crossings:  New Approaches to the Irish Border,” Irish Studies 
Review 18 (3) (2010): 265-284; and Catherine Nash, Bryonie Reid, and Brian Graham, Partitioned Lives:  
The Irish Borderlands (Abingdon, Oxon:  Ashgate, 2013), 109-139.   
 
Is Inequality the Cause of Conflict? – See Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch, “Square Pegs in Round Holes: Inequalities, Grievances, and Civil Wars,” International Studies 
Quarterly 58 (2) (2014): 418-431; Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, 
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2013); Lars-Erik 
Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Horizontal Inequalities and 
Ethnonationalist Civil War:  A Global Comparison,” American Political Science Review 105 (3) (2011): 
478-495; Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?  New 
Data and Analysis,” World Politics 62 (1) (2010): 87-119; Agnes Katalin Koós, Peace and Conflict in 
Inter-Group Relations:  The Role of Economic Inequality (Lanham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2015); and 
Valle Koube and Tobias Böhmelt, “Grievances, Economic Wealth, and Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace 
Research 51 (1) (2014): 19-33.  Some research suggests that it is not inequality but economic development 
of states that makes terrorism more likely.  See Charles Boehmer and Mark Daube, “The Curvilinear 
Effects of Economic Development on Domestic Terrorism,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public 
Policy 19 (3) (2013): 359-369.  Similarly, Gartzke and Weisenger find a wealth effect where developed 
states are more likely to be peaceful.  See Eruj Gartzke and Alex Weisenger, “Under Construction: 
Development, Democracy, and Difference as Determinants of Systemic Liberal Peace,” International 
Studies Quarterly 58 (1) (2014): 130-145.  Peace agreements that incorporate equality are more enduring.  
For this argument, see Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman. “Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil 
Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (2) (2012): 155-182 and Daniel Druckman and Cecilia Albin, 
“Distributive Justice and the Durability of Peace Agreements,” Review of International Studies 37 (3) 
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Jennifer Todd, “Equality as Steady State or Equality as a Threshold? Northern Ireland after the Good 
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The Lack of Transformation since the Good Friday Agreement – See Neil Jarman and John Bell, 
“Routine Divisions:  Segregation and Daily Life in Northern Ireland,” in Everyday Life After the Conflict:  
The Impact of Devolution and North-South Cooperation, ed. Cillian McGrattan and Elizabeth Meehan 
(Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2012), 39-53; Duncan Morrow, “The Rocky Road from 
Enmity,” in Everyday Life After the Conflict:  The Impact of Devolution and North-South Cooperation, ed. 
Cillian McGrattan and Elizabeth Meehan (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2012), 20-36 and 
Elizabeth Meehan and Fiona McKay, “’A New Politics’ of Participation?” in Everyday Life After the 
Conflict:  The Impact of Devolution and North-South Cooperation, ed. Cillian McGrattan and Elizabeth 
Meehan (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2012), 169-183.  F or the difficulty of overcoming 
sectarianism from a study of maternal situations, see Lisa Smyth and Martina McKnight, “Maternal 
Situations:  Sectarianism and Civility in a Divided City,” Sociological Review 61 (2) (2013): 304-322.   
 
Peacebuilding in Divided Societies – For a conceptualization of the different challenges that come after a 
peace agreement, see Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “Beyond the Absence of War:  The 
Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies,” Review of International Studies 36 (2) (2010): 367-390. 
For the difficulty of peacebuilding in divided societies, see Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict 
Societies:  Strategy and Process (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2005); John Paul Lederach, Building Peace:  
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1997); Roger Mac Ginty, “Everyday Peace:  Bottom-up and Local Agency in Conflict-affected Societies,” 
Security Dialogue  45 (6) (2014): 548-564; Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local 
Resistance:  Hybrid Forms of Peace (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); John Nagle and Mary-
Alice C. Clancy, Shared Society or Benign Apartheid?  Understanding Peacebuilding in Divided Societies 
(New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and Dennis Sandole, Peacebuilding:  Preventing Violent Conflict 
in a Complex World (Cambridge:  Polity Press, 2010).  Chandra Lekha Sriram demonstrates that 
peacebuilding needs to come from the local not just the international level and that efforts to bring post-
conflict justice inevitably bring resistance.  See Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Post-Conflict Justice and 
Hybridity in Peacebuilding:  Resistance or Cooptation?”  in Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds.), 
Hybrid Forms of Peace:  From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 58-72.  
 
Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland – See Roberto Belloni, “Northern Ireland:  Civil Society and the Slow 
Building of Peace,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding:  A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz 
(Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2010), 105-129 and Maria Power, Building Peace in Northern Ireland 
(Liverpool:  Liverpool University Press, 2011).  
 
The Importance of Creating Civil Society and Social Capital to Promote Peace from the Grassroots – 
See Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland:  Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International 
Intervention (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2014); Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, 
“The People’s Peace?  Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy,” International 
Political Science Review 28 (3) (2007): 293-324; Thania Paffenholz, “Civil Society,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Peacebuilding, ed. Roger Mac Ginty (London:  Routledge, 2013), 347-359; Thania 
Paffenholz, Civil Society & Peacebuilding:  A Critical Assessment (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2010); James 
D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 
90 (4) (1996): 715-735; Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, “The Local Turn in Peace Building:  A 
Critical Agenda for Peace,” Third World Quarterly 34 (5) (2013): 763-783;  and Mathijs van Leeuwen, 
Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of Civil-Society Peacebuilding (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate, 
2009).  Timothy Donais suggests that peacebuilding needs to be conceptualized as consensus building in 
Peacebuilding and Local Ownership:  Post-Conflict Consensus-Building (London:  Routledge, 2012), 
especially 58-77. Lafranc contends that bottom up peace approaches attempt to delink individuals from 
conflict and therefore depoliticize what are inevitably group conflicts.  See Sandrine Lafranc, “A Critique 
of ‘Bottom Up’ Peacebuilding:  Do Peaceful Individuals Make Peaceful Societies?” in Peacebuilding, 
Memory and Reconciliation:  Bridging Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches, ed. Bruno Charbonneau 
and Geneviève Parent (London:  Routledge, 2012), 34-52.  For a collection of successful stories of civil 
society building peace, see Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette Verhoeven (eds.), 
People Building Peace II:  Successful Stories of Civil Society (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2005). For the role 
of the local peace activist in this process, see Allison M. S. Watson, “Agency and the Everyday Activist,” 
in Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds.), Hybrid Forms of Peace:  From Everyday Agency to 
Post-Liberalism (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 39-57.  
 
Overcoming the Ethnic Divide and Building Peace - The reality that ethnic cleavages reduce social 
capital is found in Tim Reeskens and Matthew Wright, “Nationalism and the Cohesive Society: A 
Multilevel Analysis of the Interplay Among Diversity, National Identity, and Social Capital Across 27 
European Societies,” Comparative Political Studies 46 (2) (2013): 153-181; The need for improved inter-
ethnic relations in the peacebuilding process is stressed in Mehmet Gurses and Nicolas Rost,” Sustaining 
the Peace after Ethnic Civil Wars,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30 (5) (2013): 469–491. The 
role of fair and competitive elections in defusing ethnic conflict is stressed in Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian  
Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug, “Elections and Ethnic Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 46 (3) 
(2013): 387-417.  The importance of moving to civic versions of nationalism away from a nativist 
conception of self in building trust is found in Markus M. L. Crepaz, Jonathan T. Polk, Ryan S. Bakker and 
Shane P. Singh, “Trust Matters:  The Impact of Ingroup and Outgroup Trust on Nativism and Civicness,” 
Social Science Quarterly (Forthcoming). 
 
Conceptualizing the Role of Civil Society in the Northern Ireland Peace Process – See Sean Byrne 
“Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,” Journal of Peace 
Research 38(3) (2001): 327–352; Christopher Farrington, “Models of Civil Society and Their Implications 
for the Northern Peace Process,” in Global Change, Civil Society and the Northern Ireland Peace Process:  
Implementing the Political Settlement, ed. Christopher Farrington (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
113-141; Landon E. Hancock, “The Northern Irish Peace Process:  From Top to Bottom,” International 
Studies Review 10 (2) (2008): 225-231; Madeleine Leonard, “Bonding and Bridging Social Capital:  
Reflections from Belfast,” Sociology 38 (5) (2004): 927-944; Rogerm Mac Ginty, “Hybrid Civil Society:  
Northern Ireland,” in International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance:  Hybrid Forms of Peace 
(Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 183-206; Connie O’Brien, “Integrated Community 
Development/Conflict Resolution Strategies as ‘Peace Building Potential’ in South Africa and Northern 
Ireland,” Community Development Journal 42 (1) (2007): 114-130. 
 
The Importance of Civil Society in Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland – See Roberto Belloni, “Shades 
of Orange and Green:  Civil Society and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland,” in Social Capital and 
Peace-Building:  Creating and Resolving Conflict with Trust and Social Networks, ed. Michaelene Cox 
(New York:  Routledge, 2009), 5-21; Peter Doran, “Can Civil Society Succeed Where Elites Have Failed in 
the War on Sectarianism?  Towards an Infinitely Demanding Politics for the North,” Irish Journal of 
Sociology 18 (2) (2010): 126-150; Marianne Elliott, “The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution:  The 
Opsahl Commission in Northern Ireland, 1992-93,” Cathy Gormley-Heenan, “Northern Ireland:  Securing 
the Peace,” in Beyond Settlement:  Making Peace Last after Civil Conflict, ed. Vanessa E. Shields and 
Nicholas D. J. Baldwin. (Madison, NJ:  Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2008), 224-236; and Timothy 
J. White, “Consolidating Peace and Democracy in Northern Ireland:  The Role of Civil Society,” Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict 4 (3) (2011): 259-271.  For the best critique of this approach see Paul Dixon, “The 
Politics of Conflict:  A Constructivist Critique of Consociational and Civil Society Theories,” Nations and 
Nationalism 18 (1) (2012): 98-121. 
 
Human Rights, Human Needs, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding – For a human rights approach, 
see Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Christine Bell, “Peacebuilding, Law and Human Rights,” in Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, ed. 
Roger Mac Ginty (London:  Routledge, 2013), 249-260; Ram Manikkalingam, “Promoting Peace and 
Protecting Rights:  How are Human Rights Good and Bad for Resolving Conflict?” Essex Human Rights 
Review 5 (1) (2008): 1-11; Julie A Mertus and Jeffrey W. Helsing (eds.), Human Rights and Conflict:  
Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding (Washington:  US Institute of Peace Press, 
2006); and Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, War, Conflict and Human 
Rights:  Theory and Practice (2nd edition) (London:  Routledge, 2014).  For a  human needs approach to 
conflict resolution, see Kevin Abruch and Christopher Mitchell (eds.), Conflict Resolution and Human 
Needs:  Linking Theory and Practice (London:  Routledge, 2013). 
 
Human Rights and the Northern Ireland Peace Process – Christine Bell, “Human Rights, Peace 
Agreements and Conflict Resolution:  Negotiating Justice in Northern Ireland,” in Human Rights and 
Conflict:  Exploring Links Between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, ed. Julie Mertus and Jeffrey Helsing 
(Washington:  U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), 345-376; Brice Dickson, The European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2010); Colin J. 
Harvey, “Building a Human Rights Culture in a Political Democarcy:  The Role of the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission,” in Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland, ed. 
Colin J. Harvey (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 113-130. 
 
NGOs and Peacebuilding – Diana Chigas, “Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers,” in 
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 553-581; Roger A. Coate, 
“Civil Society as a Force for Peace,” International Journal of Peace Studies 9 (2) (2004): 57-86 and 
Jonathan Goodhand, Aiding Peace:  The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner, 2006).  
Amanda Murdie explores the ability of NGOs like Oxfam and Human Rights Watch to improve human 
security in Help or Harm:  The Human Security Effects of International NGOs (Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 2014).  Cristie Ryerson in Peacebuilding and NGOs:  State-Civil Society Interactions 
(New York:  Routledge, 2013) finds that liberal attempts to build civil society in Cambodia have let to new 
dynamics of conflict rather than peacebuilding as liberal peace theorists assume.  For a general overview of 
NGOs role in international relations, see Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders:  
Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 
NGOs Role in Northern Ireland Peacebuilding – For an overview of NGO’s role in Northern Ireland, see 
Feargal Cochrane, “Two Cheers for the NGOs:  Building Peace in Northern Ireland,” in A Farewell to 
Arms?  Beyond the Good Friday Agreement, ed. Michael Cox, Adrien Guelke, and Fiona Stephen 
(Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2006), 253-266. For a good analysis of 10 civil society groups’ 
contribution to the peace process, see Feargal Cochrane and Seamus Dunn, People Power:  The Role of 
Voluntary and Community Sector in the Northern Ireland Conflict (Cork:  Cork University Press, 2002).   
For a recent assessment of NGOs in Ireland and in other postconflict situations as well as a case study of 
the Community Foundation of Northern Ireland, see Max Stephenson Jr. and Laura Zanotti, Peacebuilding 
through Community Based NGOs:  Paradoxes and Possibilities (Sterling, VA:  Kumarian, 2012), 
especially 55-77.  
 
The Role of the Churches in Building Peace and Promoting Transitional Justice – See Qamar-ul Huda 
and Katherine Marshall, “Religion and Peacebuilding,” in Integrated Peacebuilding:  Innovative 
Approaches to Transforming Conflict (Boulder:  Westview, 2013), 151-171 and Daniel Philpott, “What 
Religion Brings to the Politics of Transitional Justice,” Journal of International Affairs 61 (1) (2007): 93-
110; Nukhet Ahu Sandal, “Religious Actors as Epistemic Communities in Conflict Transformation:  The 
Cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland,” Review of International Studies 37 (3) (2011): 929-949. 
   
The Role of the Churches in Building Civil Society and Peace in Northern Ireland – See John D. 
Brewer, Gareth I. Higgins, and Francis Teeney, Religion, Civil Society, & Peace In Northern Ireland 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2011); Gladys Ganiel and Paul Dixon, “Religion, Pragmatic 
Fundamentalism, and the Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 45 
(3) (2008): 419-436; Patrick Grant, “Religion and the Peace Process,” in Religion and Peacebuilding, ed. 
Harold Coward and Gordon S. Smith (eds.), (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 2004), 261-
278; Clare Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2005); Maria 
Power, From Ecumenism to Community Relations : Inter-church Relationships in Northern Ireland 1980-
2005(Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 2007); and Maria Power, “Providing a Prophetic Voice?  Churches 
and Peacebuilding, 1968-2005,” in Building Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Maria Power (Liverpool:  
University of Liverpool Press, 2011), 73-92. For a historic analysis of the relationship between religion and 
violence in Northern Ireland, see Martin Dillon, God and the Gun:  The Church and Irish Terrorism (New 
York:  Routledge, 1999). 
 
The Role of the Business and the Business Community in Promoting Peace – Guy Ben-Porat, 
“Between Power and Hegemony:  Business Communities in Peace Processes,” Review of International 
Studies 31 (2) (2005): 325-348; Shawn MacDonald, “Peacebuilding and the Private Sector,” in Integrated 
Peacebuilding:  Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict (Boulder:  Westview, 2013), 127-150; 
and Derek Sweetman, Business, Conflict Resolution, Peacebuilding:  Contributions from the Private Sector 
(London:  Routledge, 2009).  Some recent research indicates that business interests do not have to directly 
lobby for peace since the neoliberal global economic order already provides incentives for political elites to 
pursue peace.  See Stephen G. Brooks, “Economic Actors’ Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War 
and Peace,” International Organization 67 (4) (2013): 863-888.   
 
The Role of Business in Promoting Peace in Northern Ireland – For the role of cross-border commerce 
after the Good Friday Agreement, see John Bradley, “The Island Economy:  Ireland Before and After the 
Belfast Agreement,” in Crossing the Border:  New Relationships between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland, ed. John Coakley and Liam O’Dowd (Dublin:  Irish Academic Press, 2007), 61-86; 
Caroline Creamer and Brendan O’Keeffe, “Raising the Emerald Curtain:  Communities and Collaboration 
along the Border,” in Spacing Ireland:  Place, Society and Culture in a Post-Boom Era, ed. Caroline 
Crowley and Denis Linehan (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 2013), 58-72; Katy Hayward and 
Eoin Magennis, “The Business of Building Peace:  Private Sector Cooperation across the Irish Border,” 
Irish Political Studies 29 (1) (2014): 154-175; Eoin Magennis, “The Impact of Devolution on Everyday 
Life, 1999-2010:  The Case of Cross-Border Commerce,” in Everyday Life after the Irish Conflict:  The 
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